All decrees and orders made by the court in any proceeding under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, are appealable.

( 1 ) THIS appeal is against an order made by the District Judge, 24-Parganas on an application by tile wife for maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings, under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The husband started the proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act and prayed for a decree of divorce. In the application under Section 24 of the Act, the wife, who is the appellant before us made a prayer for a sum of Rs. 3000 "or such other Bum as the Court may think reasonable and sufficient'' for the expenses of this suit and Rs. 650/-per month for her maintenance during the pendency of the proceedings. The learned District Judge has made an order directing the husband to pay maintenance pendente lite at the rate of Rs. 200/-per month with effect from the 1-5-1956. As regards the prayer for expenses of the proceedings, e passed the following order :"i tentatively assess the probable cost of the respondent in this divorce proceeding at Rs. 500/ -. The petitioner is directed to pay the respondent in this divorce proceeding at Rs. 500/ -. The petitioner is directed to pay the respondent Rs. 200/- towards the aforesaid costs. This cost must be paid by 21-6-56. "

( 2 ) THE wife now contends in appeal against the order that the amount of the maintenance pendente lite or the expenses for the proceeding are inadequate.

( 3 ) A preliminary objection was taken by Mr. Das Gupta on behalf of the husband. His contention is that no appeal lies against the order made by the learned Judge. This is an important question which requires careful consideration.

( 4 ) IF the Act itself had contained no provision for appeal, appeal would lie against orders or decrees made in the proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, if under the Code of Civil Procedure an appeal would have lain. This would be the result of the principle laid down in the case of Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekhara Thevar, 74 Ind App 264 : (AIR 1948 PC 12 ). The Act, however, has made definite provisions as regards appeals and it is not necessary for us to consider the principle laid down in Adaikappa's case. The provisions as regards appeals are contained in Section 28 of the Act which is in these words :"all decrees and orders made by the court in any proceeding under this Act shall be enforced in like manner as the decrees and orders ok the court made in the exercise of the original civil jurisdiction are enforced, and may be appealed from under any law for the time being in force : provided that there shall be no appeal on the subject of costs only. "

( 5 ) THE question before us is one of construction of the words used by the legislature in this section. Two rival constructions require consideration. One is that by this section the legislature has provided that an appeal will lie against all decrees and orders made by the court in any proceeding under the Act and that the forum and other matters in connection with the hearing of the appeal would be, decided in accordance with the laws that may be in force for the time being. The other construction which is suggested is that this section does not say anything positive itself as regards appealability of decrees and orders but merely says that if an appeal lies against decrees an3 orders made in any proceeding under this Act under some law that may be in force at the time, then an appeal will lie and not otherwise.

( 6 ) IN my opinion, the first construction should be preferred to the other construction that has been suggested. In the first place, it seems to me unreasonable to hold the legislature guilty of leaving the matter of appealability entirely at large, as it would be, if appealability was to depend on any law for the time being in force. It is much more reasonable in my opinion, to think that when the legislature took upon itself the task of making provisions as regards appeals, it intended to make definite provisions.

( 7 ) IN the second place, it seems to me that the se