1955 Supreme(Cal) 127
HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
DAS GUPTA, GUHA RAY
NATIONAL MOTOR INDUSTRIES LTD. - Appellant
Versus
BIRENDRA NATH MITRA - Respondent
Civil Revn. 559 Of 1955
Decided On : JULY 2, 1955
INDRANIL GHOSH, JITENDRA KR.SENGUPTA, RABINDRA N.MITRA, RABIRANJAN DASGUPTA
The failure of a landlord to carry out repairs under Section 38(3) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act does not entitle the tenant to suspension of rent, and the tenant's remedy is limited to deducting the cost of repairs from the rent or otherwise recovering it from the landlord.
Headnote:
WEST BENGAL PREMISES RENT CONTROL ACT - SECTION 38(3) - FAILURE TO CARRY OUT REPAIRS - SUSPENSION OF RENT - REMEDY AVAILABLE TO TENANT - LANDLORD'S LIABILITY TO CARRY OUT REPAIRS - TENANT'S RIGHT TO DEDUCT COST OF REPAIRS FROM RENT.
Fact of the Case:
The tenant challenged an order under Section 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, arguing that rent should be suspended due to the landlord's failure to carry out necessary repairs, making the premises uninhabitable.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the tenant was not entitled to suspension of rent solely because of the landlord's failure to carry out repairs. The court reasoned that the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act did not provide a specific remedy for such failure and that the general law did not recognize suspension of rent as a remedy for breach of the landlord's duty to repair.
Issues: 1. Whether the tenant was entitled to suspension of rent due to the landlord's failure to carry out repairs. 2. Whether the provisions of Section 38(3) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act provided the sole remedy for the tenant in such cases.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court found that the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act did not provide a specific remedy for the landlord's failure to carry out repairs under Section 38(3). 2. The court held that the general law did not recognize suspension of rent as a remedy for breach of the landlord's duty to repair. 3. The court reasoned that the provisions of Section 38(3) provided a convenient mode of enforcing the landlord's duty to repair, but did not constitute the sole remedy available to the tenant.
Final Decision: The court set aside the order of the lower court and directed that the application under Section 14(4) be dealt with in accordance with law, taking into account the provisions of Section 38(3) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act.
( 1 ) THIS Rule is directed against an order under Section 14 (4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act. The main objection of the tenant to the landlord's prayer for the order under Section 14 (4) of the Act with which we are concerned now is that there should be' suspension of rent because of the landlord's failure to carry out repairs which were necessary to make the premises habitable or useable except with great inconvenience. That a portion of the premises was in need of such repairs is no longer disputed. The learned Subordinate Judge has, however, held that the tenant is not entitled to suspension of rent because of the landlord's failure to carry out the repairs and has directed the tenant to deposit an amount of Rs. 4631-12 annas as arrears of rent within fifteen days of the order and Rs. 143-12 annas per month as rent with effect from February, 1955, by the 15th of the following month.
( 2 ) THE first question for consideration therefore is whether tenant is entitled to suspension of rent because of the landlord's failure to carry out the repairs. Before the enactment of Section 38 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act the landlord, in the absence of any agreement express or implied, had no legal liability to carry out repairs. In the present case no such agreement is alleged. The only liability of the landlord is, therefore, under Section 38 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act which provides that the landlord shall be bound to make such repairs without which the premises are not habitaole or usable except with great inconvenience. The landlord did not carry out the repairs and the tenant has obtained an order from the Rent Controller for carrying out the repairs himself as provided in the second sub-section of Section 38 of the Act. The Statute in imposing this liability of making certain repairs on the landlord has not said anything as to the remedy available to the tenant if the landlord does not carry out the repairs. In the second sub-section it has provided that where after the service of notice the landlord neglects to make repairs within a reasonable time, the tenant may apply to the Rent Controller for permission, to make repairs and the Controller, after giving the landlord an opportunity of being heard and on considering the estimate of cost which the tenant has to submit along with his application, may permit the tenant to make such repairs "at a cost not exceeding such amount as may be' specified in the order". The subsection goes on to say,"it shall thereafter be lawful for the tenant to make such repairs. . . . . . . and to 'deduct the cost thereof which shall in no case exceed the amount so specified from the rent or otherwise recover it from the landlord. "a limit of one-twelfth of the rent payable by the tenant for the year is put on the amount which can be recovered except in cases of repairs which come within the third sub-section.
( 3 ) IT is argued on behalf of the opposite party that the provision in the second sub-section of Section 38 that the Rent Controller may allow the tenant to make the repairs and thereafter it shall be lawful for the tenant to deduct the cost of repairs from the rent or otherwise recover it from the landlord, is the sole remedy that is available to the tenant. It is well settled that where a new right is created and a remedy provided by the same Statute for infringement of that right, the Courts should treat that remedy as the sole remedy available unless on the words of the Statute it can reasonably be held that the Legislature intended the ordinary remedies under the general law for infringement of such right to continue to be available. 'it is hardly necessary to consider this principle of law in the present case, as I do not think it is correct to say that what the second sub-section provides is really a remedy for infringement of the right. Clearly, it provides only a convenient mode of enforcing the right. The provisio