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1955 Supreme(Cal) 118

HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
K. C. DAS GUPTA, GUHA RAY
ADHAR CHANDRA MONDAL - Appellant
Versus
BISTU PADA GURE - Respondent
Civil Rules 303  Of  1955
Decided On : JUNE 24, 1955

Under the West Bengal Bargadar's Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is ousted in respect of disputes regarding the division or delivery of produce, and such disputes must be decided exclusively by the Board established under the Act, even if no Board has been established for the local area in question.

Headnote:

BARGADAR'S ACT - SECTION 7(1), 9(2), 18 - JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURTS - DISPUTE REGARDING DIVISION OR DELIVERY OF PRODUCE - EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF BOARD ESTABLISHED UNDER THE ACT - NO JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURTS EVEN IF NO BOARD ESTABLISHED FOR THE LOCAL AREA.

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff filed two suits in a Small Cause Court for the recovery of Rs. 500/- as the price of barga produce on the basis of a registered Kabulayat. The defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the court, arguing that under the West Bengal Bargadar's Act, disputes regarding the division or delivery of produce must be decided by a Board established for the local area and that no court shall entertain any suit in respect of such matters.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain the suits, as the disputes fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board established under the West Bengal Bargadar's Act. The court noted that the language of the relevant provisions of the Act was clear and unequivocal, and that the Legislature had expressed its intention "with irresistible clearness" that no Court shall entertain any suit whatsoever in respect of a matter required under Section 7 (1) to be decided by a Board referred to in that sub-section.

Issues: Whether the Civil Courts had jurisdiction to entertain the suits, given that no Board had been established for the local area in question.

Ratio Decidendi: The court interpreted Sections 7(1), 9(2), and 18 of the West Bengal Bargadar's Act to mean that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was ousted in respect of disputes regarding the division or delivery of produce, and that such disputes must be decided exclusively by the Board established under the Act. The court rejected the argument that the absence of a Board for the local area in question gave the Civil Courts jurisdiction, holding that the language of the Act was mandatory and that the Legislature had intended to establish a comprehensive statutory mechanism for the resolution of such disputes.

Final Decision: The court made the rules absolute, set aside the judgments and decrees of the lower court, and dismissed both the suits. The parties were directed to bear their own costs throughout.

GUHA, J.

( 1 ) THESE two rules at the instance of the Defendant petitioner are directed against two orders passed by a Small Cause Court Judge decreeing the Plaintiff's suits for the recovery of Rs. 500/-as the price of barga produce on the basis of a registered Kabulayat. The rules were heard analogously.

( 2 ) THE short point that has arisen for decision is whether the Court concerned had jurisdiction to try the suits.

( 3 ) UNDER Section 7 (1), West Bengal Bargadar's Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) every dispute between a bargadar and the owner regarding the division or delivery of the produce shall be decided by a Board established for the local area within which the land concerned is situated. Under Section 9 (2) of the same Act no Court shall entertain any suit in respect of a matter required under Section 7 (1) to be decided by a Board referred to in that sub-section. Under Section 18 the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, etc. The cumulative effect of these provisions is obviously that the only forum available for the settlement of every dispute relating to matters mentioned in Section 7 (1) in the instant case the dispute is regarding the division or delivery of the produce is the Bhag Chas Conciliation Board established for the area concerned and no Court shall entertain any suit required to be decided by the Board. Under Section 1 (2) the Act extends to the whole of West Bengal. Legislature has not left it to the sweet will or option of the Executive to decide whether any area of West Bengal should be left out of the purview of the Act or the statutory machinery as provided for in Section 7 (1) is to be established in any parlicular area or not. What, however, is to happen where, as in the present case, no Board has been established by the Government for the local area in question? Is the jurisdiction of the Civil Court taken away even in a case like that?

( 4 ) THE point is not free from difficulty and unfortunately there is divergence of judicial opinion regarding the matter though fortunately a point like the one involved in. the present case docs not come up before the Courts very frequently. In the case of Bharat Chandra v. Gour Chandra, it was observed by G. N. Das, J. , "as there is no Board established the dispute even if it came within Section 7 (1) cannot be said to be one which requires to be decided by a Board". Similarly in the case of Krishna Chandra v. Panchu Ghosh, it was observed by Sen J. , -"only if it is found there is no such Board the Civil Court will have jurisdiction". It may be observed in passing that in neither of the above cases were detailed reasons given in support of the above view. In Muhammad Ismail Miah v. Tom Munda, 09 Cal WN 658 (C) a contrary view was, however, taken by my learned brother and Dababrata Mookerjee J. In that case it was observed that if the law requires that a matter should be decided by a Board esi. abli. shed for the local area within which the land is situated and no local Board has been established, the position is that there can be no decision by a Board, but that does not give the Civil Courts a right".

( 5 ) IN my opinion, in view of the explicit language of the relevant statute as contained in Sections 7 (1), 9 (2) and 18 the second view, viz. , the view taken by the Division Bench in Muhammad Ismail Miah's case (C), is to be preferred. In those sections, the Legislature has spoken in clear and unequivocal accents. No language can be more explicit than in the provision that no Court shall entertain any suit whatsoever in respect of a matter required under Section 7 (1) to be decided by a Board referred to in that sub-section. The use of the word "required" is highly significant in its present context. Whatever doubt about the proper forum for the decision of dispute mentioned in Clauses (a), (b) or (c) of Section 7 (1) there might be even in spite of the use of the word "shall" in






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