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1954 Supreme(Cal) 10

HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
P. N. MUKHERJEE
KRISHNA MOHAN SAMANTA - Appellant
Versus
KHANDU MOYEE DASI - Respondent
A. F. A. O.  79  Of  1953
Decided On : JANUARY 08, 1954

Advocates Appeared:
BIMAL KUMAR BANERJEE, RANJIT KUMAR BANERJEE, SUKUMAR GHOSH

An order directing execution to proceed, passed after service of notice under Order 21, Rule 22 of the Code and expiry of the date or time for showing cause against the execution of the decree, and which has attained finality in law, bars the plea of limitation by constructive res judicata.

Headnote:

LIMITATION - EXECUTION OF DECREE - NOTICE UNDER ORDER 21, RULE 22, CIVIL P. C. - JUDGMENT-DEBTOR NOT APPEARING - ORDER DIRECTING EXECUTION TO PROCEED - FINALITY OF ORDER - LIMITATION BARRED BY CONSTRUCTIVE RES JUDICATA.

Fact of the Case:

The judgment-debtors appealed against the execution of a final mortgage decree. The preliminary decree was passed in 1939 and made final in the same year. The first execution case was dismissed in 1943. In 1946, the decree-holder again applied for execution, alleging a payment made in 1944. Notices were served on the judgment-debtors under Order 21, Rule 22, Civil P. C., but they did not appear. The court ordered the execution to proceed and directed the decree-holder to take necessary steps. The execution case was later dismissed for default. In 1950, the present execution case was filed, and the judgment-debtors objected on the ground of limitation.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the payment alleged to have been made in 1944 was made by one of the judgment-debtors, who was the 'karta' of the joint family. However, it was doubtful whether the payment was sufficient to save limitation. The court also found that notices under Order 21, Rule 22 of the Code were duly served upon the judgment-debtors in the second execution case and that they did not appear to object to the execution case. The court held that the order dated 6-1-1947, directing the execution to proceed, was final and that the question of limitation was impliedly decided once for all against the judgment-debtors and was barred by constructive res judicata.

Issues: 1. Whether the payment alleged to have been made in 1944 was sufficient to save limitation? 2. Whether the notices under Order 21, Rule 22 of the Code were duly served upon the judgment-debtors in the second execution case? 3. Whether the order dated 6-1-1947, directing the execution to proceed, was final? 4. Whether the question of limitation was impliedly decided once for all against the judgment-debtors and was barred by constructive res judicata?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the payment alleged to have been made in 1944 was doubtful whether it was sufficient to save limitation. 2. The court found that notices under Order 21, Rule 22 of the Code were duly served upon the judgment-debtors in the second execution case and that they did not appear to object to the execution case. 3. The court held that the order dated 6-1-1947, directing the execution to proceed, was final and that the question of limitation was impliedly decided once for all against the judgment-debtors and was barred by constructive res judicata.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal with costs.

P. N. MOOKERJEE, J.

( 1 ) THIS is the judgment-debtors' appeal arising out of proceedings in execution of a final mortgage decree. The preliminary decree in the mortgage suit was passed on 30-8-1939 and it was made final on 9-12-1939. It was first put into execution in 1941 in Title Execution Case No. 100 of that year. The said execution case was dismissed on part satisfaction on 22-6-1943. On 19-7-1946, the mortgagee decree-holder again applied for execution alleging that limitation had been saved by a payment made towards the decree on 10-4-1944. In that execution case (Title Execution Case No. 70 of 1946) notices were served upon the judgment-debtors under Order 21, Rule 22, Civil P. C. , but none of them appeared in pursuance of the notices on the date fixed, viz. , 6-1-1947. On this last mentioned date the court recorded an order to the following effect;"notice under Order 21, Rule 22, Civil P. C. served. The judgment-debtors do not appear, process fee filed but written process not filed. To 10-1-47 for filing complete requisites. "the next order was recorded on 10-1-1947 in these terms:"decree-holder takes no steps. He do show cause for not taking step by 18-1-47. " And on this last mentioned date the execution case was dismissed for default by the following order: "decree-holder did not take step though sufficient time had already been allowed to him. Ordered that the execution case be dismissed for default. "

( 2 ) THEREAFTER on 12-1-1950, the present execution case was filed and on receipt of notice under Order 21, Rule 22, Civil P. C. , the judgment-debtors appeared and filed objections under Section 47 of the Code. The main objection taken to the execution of the decree was on the ground of limitation. It was pleaded by the judgment-debtors that there was no payment as alleged by the decree-holder on 10-4-1944 and- that therefore, the second execution case (Title Execution Case No. 70 of 1946) was time-barred. Accordingly, the judgment-debtors contended that the present execution must be dismissed on the ground of limitation. In connection with this question of limitation, it was also contended by the judgment-debtors that in the second execution case there was no service upon them of the notices under Order 21, Rule 22 of the Code. Both the courts below have overruled the judgment-debtors' objections and have directed the execution to proceed. Against this concurrent decision, the present appeal has been filed by the judgment-debtors.

( 3 ) ON the question of the payment, alleged to have been made on 10-4-1944, the courts below have found it as a fact that such payment was made by one of the judgment-debtors Krishna Samanta. The courts below have further found that Krishna Mohan was the 'karta' of the joint family of which the other judgment-debtors were members. But it appears that the judgment-debtors also included a deity of which the other judgment-debtors were shebaits. It is at least open to doubt whether the payment made by Krishna Mohan Samanta without describing himself as the Karta or as the shebait of the Deity or as purporting to act on behalf of all the members of the joint family or on behalf of all the shebaits of the Deity can be taken as a sufficient payment for the purpose of saving limitation. There is also very little evidence that Krishna Mohan made the payments as 'karta' or as Shebait of the deity. I am, therefore, not prepared to proceed in this case on the finding of the two courts below that the alleged payment of 10-4-1944 would be sufficient to save the second execution from being time-barred. That, however, is of no material assistance to the judgment-debtors in the present case as, in my opinion, the plea of limitation, so far as the second execution case is concerned, and necessarily, therefore, so far as the present execution case goes, is barred by constructive res judicata. I am in entire agreement with the findings of the two courts below that under Order 21, Rule 22 notices wer





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