P. N. MOOKERJEE, J.

( 1 ) THE defendant appellant was the tenant under the plaintiff respondent in respect of a part of the ground floor of premises No. 70-A Park Street on a monthly rental of Rs. 45/ -. The tenancy was terminated by a notice to quit, dated 30th July, 1949, given by the plaintiff landlord, asking the defendant to quit and vacate on the expiry of the last day of August 1949. On 21st September 1949, the present suit for ejectment was filed before the learned Munsif, 2nd Court, Sealdah.

( 2 ) IN the plaint an allegation was made substantially to the effect that the tenant was guilty of contravention of Clauses (m), (o) and (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 and was, accordingly, not entitled to the protection of the Rent Control Law. The landlord claimed a decree for ejectment and mesne profits.

( 3 ) THE suit was contested on various grounds of which only two are material for our present purpose. The first is that the notice to quit is insufficient and, therefore, bad in law as the tenancy being for manufacturing purposes could not be terminated by the notice to quit, given by the landlord, which was not a six month's notice as required by law. Secondly, the tenant denies that there has been any contravention on his part of any of the Clauses (m), (o) and (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act to disentitle him to the benefits of Rent control Law. These are the only two points which have been argued by Mr. Chakravarti in support of his client's appeal.

( 4 ) THE learned Munsif accepted both the above contentions and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. On appeal by the plaintiff-landlord, that decision has been reversed by the learned Additional District Judge who has held in the plaintiff's favour on both the above questions and has, accordingly, decreed the suit. Hence this second appeal by the tenant.

( 5 ) THERE is no dispute now that the tenancy was taken for running a sweetmeat shop under the name of 'jalajog'. There is also no dispute that the disputed premises comprised, inter alia, a shop room, a kitchen and a verandah. The appellant contends that the kitchen was taken for the purpose of preparing sweets for sale in the bigger shop room which together with the verandah comprised, practically speaking, the other part of the tenancy and it is argued therefrom that the purpose of the tenancy -- or at least its primary purpose -- was to prepare, -- or, to use the word, so often repeated by the appellant's learned Advocate, "to manufacture", --sweets for sale and that, accordingly, the tenancy was for "manufacturing purposes" within the meaning of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. This argument was accepted by the learned Munsif but was rejected on appeal by the learned Additional District Judge.

( 6 ) IN my opinion, the view of the lower appellate Court is right. The use of the word "manufacture" to describe the process of preparation of sweets -- though not unknown -- is, generally speaking, not very appropriate and I am not prepared to hold that, as a general rule, preparation of sweetmeats would answer the test of "manufacture" for purposes of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Normally it does not and the present case is no exception.-- 'joyanti Hosiery Mills v. Upendra Chandra', AIR 1946 Cal 317 (A) is hardly in point. There can be no doubt also that whatever the meaning of the word "manufacture" may be, the jpresent lease was at least as much for sale of sweets as for preparing the same in the disputed premises. That being so, it was not solely for manufacturing purposes but was as much for other purposes as well. It was, therefore, a lease for "any other purpose" within the meaning of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and the test of primary purpose would not help the appellant. It seems to me further that the primary purpose of running a sweetmeat shop is to sell sweets, whether manufactured at the spot or brought from elsewhere. The t

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