The limitation period for applications for a reference to the Court under the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, is six months from the date of the award, as provided in the second alternative of Section 18 (2) (b) of the Land Acquisition Act.

( 1 ) THIS Rule raises an interesting question under Section 8 (2) of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 regarding limitation for applications for a reference to this Court that may be made under the Act.

( 2 ) THE facts are simple and are as follows. It appears that on 6-10-1949, a notification, numbered 8214/l. A. , (P. W.) dated 23-9-1949, was published under Section 4 of the Act to the effect that the Provincial Government had decided to acquire a particular area of land belonging to the petitioners. The area concerned, we are informed, is 108. 07 acres of which 82. 52 acres are in the occupation of tenants, while the rest, namely 25. 55 acres are in the khas possession of the petitioners. On the publication of that Notification, the petitioners lodged a claim, presumably under Section 5 (2) of Act, and asked for an award at the rate of Rs. 200/- per cottah. So far as the tenanted lands are concerned, they asked for a total amount of Rs. 9,86,000/- of which according to them, Rs. 6,16,250/- would have to be their own allotment, while Rs. 3,69,750/- would go to the tenants as their share of the compensation. With regard to the khas lands the claim was for an amount of Rs. 3,02,000/- which there would be nobody to share, inasmuch as they were lands in khas possession. After the above claim had been lodged, the Land Acquisition Collector made an award on 5-2-1951, by which he awarded on account of all the lands acquired a total amount of only Rs. 17,379/ -. The order of the Collector mentions three other sums as component parts of the said sum of Rs. 17,379/- but what those sums individually stand for, could not be explained to us by either of the parties.

( 3 ) A notice of the award was served on the petitioners on 6-2-1951, presumably, under some rule or practice, but it was not till 30-7-1951, that they made an application for a reference to the Court under Section 8 (1) (a) of the Act. That application was thrown out by the Collector on 21-8-1951 on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The Collector referred to Section 8 (2) of the Act under which the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act apply mutatis mutandis in respect of any reference made to the Court under Sub-section (1 ). The Collector "took the view that since the petitioners had not made their application within six weeks from the date on which the notice of the award had been served upon them, their application was time barred, although it was within six months from the date of the award. The present Rule is directed against that order.

( 4 ) ON behalf of the petitioners it was contended by Mr. Bakshi that, in fact, there was no period of limitation at all for applications for a reference to the Court to be made under the Act. He pointed out that all that Sub-section (2) of Section 8 provided was that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act would apply mutatis mutandis in respect of any reference made to the Court under Sub-section (1 ). The language being 'any reference made to the Court', it was contended that what this section incorporated by reference were only those provisions of the Land Acquisition Act which related to the merits of the questions regarding which a reference might have been made, taut the process of making the reference itself, in other words, the making of the reference, was not covered by the language of the sub-section. I am bound to say that if one takes the language of Section 8 (2) literally, the conclusion contended for by Mr. Bakshi must follow. It may, however, be that what one finds here is only one of the examples of unprecise draftsmanship with which we have now become familiar and it may have to be considered in a proper case whether by the language used in Section 8 (2) the Legislature had not really intended to cover not merely a reference as made, but also the making of the reference itself. In view, however, of the special facts of the present case, it is not n