A licensee who has obtained a mere right to do something on the premises without obtaining any interest in the premises is not entitled to the provisions of standardisation of rent under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950.

( 1 ) THE opposite party K. Shaw filed an application before the Rent Controller for standardisation of rent for what he claimed was held by him as a tenant under the present petitioner, viz. , a portion of , the roof and parapet of 1 R. G. Kar Raod, Calcutta, where admittedly the opposite party displayed an advertisement by fixing a hoarding on a portion of the roof and the parapet. The petitioner raised an objection that this was no case of lease but that the opposite party K. Shaw was a mere licensee and not a lessee and accordingly the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950 were not available to him. The learned Rent Controller accepted this contention and rejected this application on this ground. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge held that this was not a case of mere license and that the paramount intention of the parties was to create a tenancy in respect of the roof and that the grantee was in the position of a tenant. He accordingly allowed the appeal and remanded the case to the Rent Controller with a direction for disposing of the application for standardisation of rent in accordance with law.

( 2 ) IT is contended before us by Mr. Atul Chandra Gupta on behalf of the petitioner that on a proper interpretation of the documents that are produced and the evidence on the record it should be held that there was no demise and that only a license was granted to the opposite party and that the opposite party K. Shaw was not a tenant within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act or within the meaning of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1950.

( 3 ) THERE is no dispute before us as regards the principle to be applied in deciding whether a person is a lessee or a licensee. The princi ples were laid down recently by their Lord ships of the Privy Council in -- 'h. E. Wijesuriya v. Attorney. General for Ceylon' in (1950) A. C. 493. In that case their Lordships had to consider whether the provisions in a permit to be given to the appellant to tap and take the produce of the rubber trees on certain Crown lands created a lease or a license. Their Lordships observed:"the decisive test is whether on its true con struction the effect of the document is to give exclusive possession to the holder of. the so- called permit; and, adopting this test, they are of opinion that all that is granted by the document is the right to tap and take the produce of the rubber trees within, a defined area together with such rights of occupation or possession and other ancillary rights as are necessary to make the primary right ef fective. They find nothing in the document which would exclude the Crown or its offi cers from entering on, and making such use of, the land as might be thought fit, subject only to the limitation that in doing so they must not derogate from the rights granted to the grantee. "this test, it may be mentioned, has been applied in a large number of English cases and on the basis thereof it has been held that an agreement to allow advertisement to be displayed or hoardings to be fixed on a part of a building does not create a lease but only grants a license. In 'wilson v. Tavener'. (1901) 1 Ch. D. 578, there was an agreement in writing by which the defendant agreed to let the plaintiff erect a hoarding upon the forecourt of a cottage and to allow him the use of a gable end for a bill-posting station at a yearly rent payable on the usual quarter-days from the then ensuing quarter day. Joyce J. held that there was no demise or lease and that the relationship of landlord and tenant was never created between them. The effect of the document was to give the plaintiff a license. In 'frank Warr and Co. Ltd. v. London County Council', (1904) 1 K. B. 713, the Court of Appeal held, on the construction of a contract made between the lessees of a theatre and the plaintiffs by which it was agreed that the plaintiffs should have the exclusive right for a term o