The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and applicability of Section 9 (1) (f) and its proviso to cases involving the standardization of rents for 'premises' constructed after 31-12-1949, and the court's emphasis on the proper application of the proviso in relation to incomplete constructions.

( 1 ) THESE are fifteen Rules obtained by as many tenants of Premises No. p-36, Royal Exhange Place Extension, Calcutta, wherein the tenants petitioners complain against the dismissal of their applications under Sections 9 and 10, West Bengal Premises Kent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, for fixation of standard rents and refund of alleged excess payments.

( 2 ) BEFORE the Rent Controller, more precisely, the Additional Kent Controller of Calcutta,--there were sixteen applications by sixteen tenants, namely, the petitioners before me and M/s. Mittra Sadani and Co. All the said applications were opposed by the landlord Sampatmull Bothra, who is the opposite party, in all the present Rules. The Rent Controller fixed the standard rents under the proviso to Section 9 (1) () of the Act assessing the 'entire construction for the purposes of that proviso at Rs. 6,73,703-6-5--Rs. 3,18,855-5-6 being the "market price" of land at the relevant date and RS, 3,54,848 being "the actual cost of construction"--and calculating the proportion in each case as contemplated in the said proviso to Section 9 (1) (f ). The landlord appealed and the learned Judge, who heard the appeals accepted the landlord's plea, raised before him for the first time, that Section 9 (1) (f),--be it the main part or the proviso--had no application to any of the above cases, all of which fell within Section 9 (1) (g), there being no other part of Section 9 applicable to the same. The learned Judge further held that as, in the cases before him, there were no materials for coming to a decision under Section 9 (1) (g) of the Act, the tenants' applications in all the sixteen cases were liable to be dismissed. The learned Judge accordingly allowed the landlord's appeals and dismissed the tenants' applications. Against this decision, the present Rules have been obtained by fifteen of the sixteen tenants concerned, the other tenant, M/s. Mittra Sadani and Co. , who was the applicant in case No. 443a. of 1941 before the Bent Controller, not having moved against the dismissal of its application by the Appellate Judge.

( 3 ) ON behalf of the petitioners two points have been urged by Mr. Gupta. In the first place, Mr. Gupta has contended that the present cases are covered by Section 9 (1) (f)--at any rate by the proviso thereof ; and, if the proviso applies, the cases were correctly decided by the Rent Controller. His second argument is that, even assuming that his first contention is unacceptable and the tenants' applications could only be dealt with under Section 9 (1) (g) of the Act, the learned Judge was in error, in the circumstances of the present cases, in not giving opportunities to the tenants applicants to produce proper materials for a decision under that section and in dismissing their applications straightway on a plea raised against them for the first time at the appellate stage.

( 4 ) THAT there is considerable force in the second submission of Mr. Gupta cannot be denied. It appears from the proceedings before the Rent Controller that there both parties rested their case on Section 9 (1) (f) and no question of the residuary provision, namely, Section 9 (1) (g) of the Act was, even remotely raised or canvassed. In such circumstances the dismissal of the tenants' applications for absence of materials under Section 9 (1) (g) without giving them opportunity to produce the same can hardly be justified and, if, in law, the position be that the present cases are outside Section 9 (1) (f) and have to be dealt with under the residuary Section 9 (1) (g) of the Act, there must be a remand to the Rent Controller in each of these cases so that the parties may have proper opportunities of producing before him relevant materials for the purpose of his decision under the said section. This view has not been seriously challenged by the learned Advocate-General, who appears for the landlord opposite-party, but his main argument has been directed aga