The constitution of a Municipality and the appointment of Commissioners must comply with the requirements of the Municipal Act, and the Government's satisfaction regarding the town's population and employment is subjective and does not require objective justification.

( 1 ) THE appellants are residents of the village of Brahmanigram within the jurisdiction of Police Station Bampurhat in the district of Birbhum. The entire village was formerly included in the Bampurhat Union under the Village Self Government Act. A portion of the Brahmanigram has however been included in the Municipality of Bampurhat that has been constituted by the Government of West Bengal in 1950.

( 2 ) AGGRIEVED by this, the appellants have, for the purpose of removing their grievance, applied to this Court for exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. They have for this purpose challenged the very constitution of Bampurhat Municipality as a mala fide act of the West Bengal Government, carried out in contravention of the Statute, and have also challenged as invalid the appointment of persons, as the first body of Commissioners of Municipality as not made in accordance with law. They have asked (1) for a writ in the nature of certiorari for the quashing of the notifications by the Government - the notification No. M. 1m-16/50 (I) of 2nd May 1950, published on 11th May 1950, by which the Municipality was constituted (referred to hereinafter as Notification A), the notification No. M. 1m-16/50 (II) of 2nd May 1950, also published on llth May 1950, by which Commissioners were appointed for the Municipality (hereinafter referred to as Notification b) and the Notification M. 1m-16/50 of 9th February 1951, (hereinafter referred to as-Notification c) by which the earlier notification appointing commissioners was amended; (2) for a, writ in the nature of mandamus for the exclusion of Brahmanigram from the Municipality, and (3) for a writ in the nature of prohibition to prevent the Commissioners of the Municipality from assessing holdings in the Brahmanigram Mauza. and from levying and realising rates from ratepayers of that Mauza. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment of Bose J. by which he passed an order rejecting the application.

( 3 ) IT is necessary to consider first the preliminary point that has been raised that the appeal is barred by limitation. The learned Advocate for the respondents contends that Article 151, Limitation Act applies to this appeal, and so the period within which the appeal has to be filed to save limitation was twenty days from the date of the order. Article 151 prescribes the period of limitation for an appeal from a decree or 'order of this High Court and some other High Courts, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, as twenty days from the date of the decree or order.

( 4 ) THE real question for decision before us-therefore is : Was the order that was made by Bose J. an order made in the exercise of original jurisdiction. Article 226 (1) of the Constitution, under which the High Court was asked to exercise its power, which it refused to exercise, is in these words:"notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High, Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. "in exercising this power, is the Court exercising original jurisdiction ? It is quite clear that in exercising the power under Article 226, the High Court is not exercising the ordinary original civil jurisdiction, that is vested in the Court under Clause 11 of the Letters Patent, or the Extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction, as is vested in the Court under Clause 13; nor is it exercising the Ordinary Original Criminal Jurisdiction vested by Clause 22, or the Extra-ordinary Original Criminal Jurisdiction vested by Clause 24. It is equally clear that it is not exercising, in exercising power und