SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1952 Supreme(Cal) 92

HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Bose
UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. - Appellant
Versus
KARTAR SINGH CAMPBELLPURI - Respondent
Civil Revn.  1801  Of  1951
Decided On : MAY 1, 1952

Advocates Appeared:
K.K.Bose, Purnendu Sekhar Basu, S.K.RAI CHAUDHARY, SITARAM BANERJEE

A Tribunal has jurisdiction to direct a person who is not a party, to pay costs of and incidental to a proceeding, to such person as the Tribunal may direct. However, the Tribunal must exercise its discretion judicially and cannot direct a person to pay costs unless there is a proper basis for doing so.

Headnote:

INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES - COSTS - POWER OF TRIBUNAL TO AWARD COSTS AGAINST A STRANGER TO THE PROCEEDING - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947, SECTION 11 (7) - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES (APPELLATE TRIBUNAL) ACT, 1950, SECTION 12 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, ARTICLE 226.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, a bank, challenged an order of the Industrial Tribunal directing it to pay the costs and expenses incurred by an employee of the petitioner in connection with certain proceedings before the Tribunal. The petitioner was not a party to the proceedings in which the order was made.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to direct a person who is not a party, to pay costs of and incidental to a proceeding, to such person as the Tribunal may direct. However, the court found that the Tribunal's order in the present case was based on a wrong apprehension of the scope of the power vested in it under the provisions of Section 11 (7), Industrial Disputes Act (Act 14 of 1947).

Issues: 1. Whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to direct a person who is not a party, to pay costs of and incidental to a proceeding? 2. Whether the Tribunal's order in the present case was based on a wrong apprehension of the scope of the power vested in it under the provisions of Section 11 (7), Industrial Disputes Act (Act 14 of 1947)?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to direct a person who is not a party, to pay costs of and incidental to a proceeding, to such person as the Tribunal may direct. The court relied on the wording of Section 11 (7), Industrial Disputes Act, which gives the Tribunal a complete discretion in the matter of costs. 2. The court found that the Tribunal's order in the present case was based on a wrong apprehension of the scope of the power vested in it under the provisions of Section 11 (7), Industrial Disputes Act (Act 14 of 1947). The court held that the Tribunal had erred in directing the petitioner to pay the costs and expenses incurred by an employee of the petitioner in connection with certain proceedings before the Tribunal, as the petitioner was not a party to the proceedings.

Final Decision: The court quashed the Tribunal's order and directed the opposite party to forbear from giving effect to the order.

BOSE, J.

( 1 ) THIS is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for an appropriate Writ for quashing of an order of an Industrial Tribunal dated 19-5-1951 whereby the petitioner has been directed to pay certain costs and expenses incurred by an employee of the petitioner in connection with certain proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal at Dehra-Dun.

( 2 ) THE petitioner is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act having its registered office at Delhi and its head office at 2 Royal Exchange Place, Calcutta. The respondent is the Chairman, Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta, having his office at 20/1, Gurusaday Dutt Boad, Ballygunge, Calcutta, within the jurisdiction of this Court.

( 3 ) THE case of the petitioner is that one A. C. Kakkar is an employee of the petitioner and Mr. Kakkar represented the employees of several other banks in certain proceedings in connection with industrial disputes between those banks and their employees before the respondent, sitting as Chairman of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Dehra Dun between 7-5-1951 and 19-5-1951. Neither the petitioner Bank nor its employees were parties to any of the disputes or proceedings dealt with by the respondent at the sitting of the Tribunal at Dehra Dun, nor did Mr. Kakkar attend the proceedings in his capacity as representative of the employees of the petitioner Bank. At the conclusion of the proceedings the respondent by an order made on 10-5-1951 directed that the Union representatives should bo paid by the respective banks of which they were employees, single second class faro both ways from their place of duty to Dehra Dun and back and diem allowance at the rate of Rs. 5 per day for the days they attended at Dohra Dun. The petitioner was directed to pay the expenses incurred by Mr. Kakkar. The order was made without hearing the petitioner bank which was not a party to the proceedings in which the order was made. The petitioner aubmita that the Banks which were parties to the proceedings at Dehra Dun and the cause of whose employees the said Mr. Kakkar was representing in those proceedings should bear the costs and expenses of Mr. Kakkar and the petitioner Bank which was not a party to any of the proceedings at Dehra Dun should not be made liable to pay the costs and expenses incurred by Mr. Kakkar in connection with the said proceedings at Dehra Dun. After the order was made and communicated to the petitioner, representation was made on behalf of the petitioner to the respondent by a letter dated 1-6-1951. The respondent thereupon heard a representative of the petitioner at a sitting hold at Naini Tal but confirmed the order made by him on 19-5-1951. This order of confirmation was made on 9-6-1951 but was communicated to the petitioner on or about 9-7-1951, and subsequently by a letter dated 10-7-1951 the respondent called upon the petitioner to pay to Mr. Kakkar the expenses ordered to be paid by him. The petitioner thereupon moved this Court and obtained a Rule Nisi.

( 4 ) MR. Sitaram Banerjee who appears for the opposite party has contended that the petitioner's proper remedy is to appeal from the decision of the Tribunal under Section 7, Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (Act 48 of 1950) and its remedy is not by way of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is submitted that the question of the power of the tribunal to award costs against one not a party to the proceeding is a substantial question of law and hence the decision is appealable tinder Section 7 (1) (a) of the Act.

( 5 ) IT appears to mo that this contention cannot be accepted. The right of appeal is a creature o Statute and it can be exercised only by those in whom the power is vested expressly or impliodly by the Statute. The Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act have set up Special Tribunals with special jurisdiction to decide industrial disputes. Sect














Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon telegram-icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top