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1951 Supreme(Cal) 120

HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Harries
GOPI NATH DAS - Appellant
Versus
NAMAI CHARAN DAS - Respondent
Civil Revision 1633  Of  1950
Decided On : APRIL 27, 1951

Advocates Appeared:
Arun Kumar Dutt, Arun Kumar Janah, Narayan Ranjan Mukherjee, SARAT CHANDRA JAIN, SITARAM BANERJEE

The starting point for limitation in the case of pre-emption is the date upon which the document is registered, not the date of execution.

Headnote:

PRE-EMPTION - BENGAL TENANCY ACT, SECTION 26F - SALE BY COURT - ATTACHMENT BEFORE JUDGMENT - LIMITATION - STARTING POINT - REGISTRATION OF DEED OF SALE - RIGHT TO PRE-EMPT - ACCRUAL.

Fact of the Case:

In 1935, the property in dispute was attached before judgment by the plaintiff in a suit. In 1936, the suit ended in a compromise decree, but the defendants failed to carry out the compromise. In 1937, the defendants applied to the Debt Settlement Board for a settlement of debts, and all proceedings in respect of debts pending in civil courts were stayed. In 1939, the parties arrived at a compromise, and the defendants agreed to convey certain properties to the plaintiff in discharge of their indebtedness. An award was made by the Debt Settlement Board embodying these terms, and the award was registered. In 1946, the Court executed a deed of sale or conveyance of the property in dispute in favor of the plaintiff, and the document was registered in 1947. Two co-sharers brought proceedings to pre-empt this sale.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the conveyance by the Court was in fact and in law a transfer by the defendant who was a co-sharer. The attachment before judgment came to an end when the award of the Debt Settlement Board was registered, and there was no attachment in existence in 1941 or 1944. The applications for pre-emption were made more than three years from the date of sale, but the starting point for limitation in the case of pre-emption is the date upon which the document is registered, not the date of execution. Therefore, the applications were within time.

Issues: 1. Whether the conveyance by the Court was a transfer by a co-sharer within the meaning of Section 26f of the Bengal Tenancy Act? 2. Whether the attachment before judgment subsisted at the time of the sales in 1941 and 1944? 3. Whether the applications for pre-emption were barred by limitation?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the conveyance by the Court was in fact and in law a transfer by the defendant who was a co-sharer. The Court executed the transfer not as owners of the property but as an agent of the defendant. 2. The Court held that the attachment before judgment came to an end when the award of the Debt Settlement Board was registered. The award put an end to the whole of the litigation and discharged any right which the plaintiff had against the defendant. 3. The Court held that the starting point for limitation in the case of pre-emption is the date upon which the document is registered, not the date of execution. Therefore, the applications were within time.

Final Decision: The Court dismissed the petition for revision and upheld the decision of the lower appellate Court.

HARRIES, C. J.

( 1 ) THIS is a petition for revision of an order of a lower appellate Court allowing an appeal in fact from an order of a learned Munsif who allowed in fact the petitioners' applications for pre-emption under Section 26f, Bengal Tenancy Act.

( 2 ) THE facts in the case are somewhat complicated. But the relevant facts can be stated as follows. In the year 1935 the property in dispute was attached before judgment by the plaintiff in a suit. On 29/5/1936 the suit ended in a compromise decree. But as the defts. failed to carry out the compromise an application was made in 1937 for execution of the decree. Shortly after this application the defts. applied to the Debt Settlement Board for a settlement of the debts owed by them to the plaintiff among others. The usual order was made under Section 34, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, staying all proceedings in respect of debts pending in civil cts. The application for execution therefore of the compromise decree was stayed. On 10/6/1939, the parties arrived at a compromise of the matter pending before the Debt Settlement Board and it was agreed that the defts. should convey to the pltf. certain properties during the month of Assar, 1346, in discharge of all their Indebtedness to the plaintiff On June 18 an award was made by the Debt Settlement Board embodying these terms and on 15/9/1939, this award was registered.

( 3 ) IT is clear that the award brought to an end the proceedings before the Debt Settlement Board and the debt which was the subject-matter of the earlier suit and which was the subject-matter of the proceedings was settled on the terms of this award. It is quite clear, I think, that after this award there was no debt existing between the defts and the plaintiff and that there was nothing to execute. The Plaintfif's. rights thereafter were governed by the award of the Debt Settlement Board which embodied the agreement entered into between the parties.

( 4 ) THE defts. failed to transfer the properties as agreed upon before the Debt Settlement Board and eventually the plaintiff had to bring a suit for specific performance of this agreement. That suit was ultimately decreed, but the defts. refused to execute any document of transfer. On 23/9/1946, the Court on behalf of the defts. executed a deed of sale or conveyance of the property in dispute in favour of the plaintiff and this document was registered on 26-3-1947. There was a transfer by this deed of sale of certain property and two co-sharers brought proceedings to pre-empt this sale. One application was allowed by the learned Munsif and the other dismissed. The learned Subordinate Judge affirmed the decision allowing the application of one applicant and reversed the learned Munsif with regard to the decision on the other application and allowed it in part.

( 5 ) THE purchaser who was the plaintiff in the original proceeding has now preferred this revision and on his behalf Mr. Sitaram Banerjee has taken a number of points. In the first place he contended that Section 26f, Bengal Tenancy Act would not apply to this case at all because the conveyance here was conveyance by the Court and not by a co-sharer. It is true that in this case the conveyance or deed of sale was executed by the Court merely because the defts. had refused to carry out a decree for specific performance. The Court executed the transfer not as owners of the property as obviously the Court had no title at all. The Court merely executed this transfer as an agent as it were of the deft. and the transfer is in fact and in law a transfer by the deft. who was a co-sharer. That being so there is no substance in this contention.

( 6 ) MR. Banerjee then argued that one of the claimants for pre-emption was not a co-sharer at the date of the sale sought to be pre-empted, by reason of the fast that that applicant based his claim to pre-empt on a sale in his favour which Mr. Banerjee contends was. void. This applicant claimed to be a co-share











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