A PERSON CANNOT BE CONVICTED FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT IF HE WAS NOT AWARE OF THE INJUNCTION BEFORE HE COMMITTED THE ACT WHICH IS ALLEGED TO BE IN BREACH OF THE INJUNCTION.

( 1 ) THIS is an appeal from a order of S. E. Das Gupta J. dated 21st April 1950 committing the appellant for contempt of Court and sentencing him to undergo simple imprisonment for one month.

( 2 ) THE parties are husband and wife, the appellant being the husband and the wife being the respondent. It seems that the husband had created a trust of his property in favour of his wife and had divested himself of the right to manage the same. There had been in fact two trust deeds but in each of the deeds a power of revocation was reserved to the settlor, the husband. It seems that the relationship between the parties was not happy and the husband had brought a suit for revocation or cancellation o the deed of trust. But that suit seems to have been abandoned and withdrawn.

( 3 ) IT is an admitted fact that at 10 a. m. on 24th June 1949, the appellant registered a deed claiming to revoke this trust and on the same day a suit was filed by the wife on the Original Side of this Court for an injunction restraining her husband, the defendant, from interfering with the plaintiff's possession and her right to manage the properties comprised in the trust deed. An application was made on the same day for an ad interim injunction which was granted. The Registrar of the Original Side of this Court appears to have been directed to communicate the Court's order to the defendant by telegram and a telegram was sent by the Court to the defendant. This telegram arrived at the post office of destination at about 3. 30 p. m. on 25th June and the only evidence before the Court was that the telegram was not actually delivered to the defendant until the morning of 26th June.

( 4 ) I do not think that it can possibly be said that the defendant had knowledge of this interim injunction made by this Court until the morning of 26th June. What is suggested on behalf of the respondent is that after receiving notice of the injunction the defendant took possession of the estate, assumed management over it and began to collect rents.

( 5 ) THAT the appellant assumed management of the estate is quite clear. But if he assumed management of the estate and entered into possession thereof before he received notice of the ad interim injunction made by this Court, no question of contempt of Court could arise. On the other hand, if the appellant took possession and assumed management of this estate after receiving notice of the interim, injunction granted by the Court, then his conduct would be contumacious to a degree and would amount to serious contempt of Court. It is clear therefore that the only point which has to be decided is whether or not the defendant-appellant took possession and assumed management of this estate after he had knowledge of the interim injunction made by this Court.

( 6 ) THE plaintiff-respondent sought to establish that the defendant-appellant had assumed possession of the estate and interfered with the plaintiff's management thereof by producing a letter signed by the superintendent in charge of the estate and countersigned by the defendant-appellant. That letter which was addressed to the-plaintiff-respondent is in these terms :"having been directed by Sree Nripendra Narayans Chowdhury, Zemindar Chapore Street, I beg most respect fully to inform you that the zamindar after revoking the Trust Deed of 28-9-1945 by a registered deed to-day, has taken possession and charge of all the properties both movable and immovables of the said Chapore Estate and has dismissed your Secretary Sri Surendra Nath Mukher-jee and the Manager Sri Birendra Nath Banerjee. Neither you nor the Secretary nor the Manager shall have any connection whatsoever with the Chapore Estate, henceforward. "

( 7 ) THERE can be no doubt that this letter is an intimation in the clearest terms that the defendant-appellant had taken over possession of the estate and. further that he had dismissed the officials who were managing the estate on behalf of the plaintif