SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1951 Supreme(Cal) 291

HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Das Gupta, Lahiri
CHINESE TANNERY OWNERS ASSOCIATION - Appellant
Versus
MAKHAN LAL - Respondent
A. F. O. O.  104  Of  1950
Decided On : DECEMBER 11, 1951

Advocates Appeared:
ATUL CHANDRA GUPTA, NANI COOMAR CHAKRABORTY, PRITISH CHANDRA ROY, SATKORI CHATTOPADHYAY, Sudhansu Kumar Sen

The court held that the provisions of Order 39, Civil P. C., were not exhaustive and did not bar the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 151, Civil P. C. The court also held that an injunction should not be granted where there is sufficient security available to satisfy any decree that the plaintiff might obtain.

Headnote:

INJUNCTION - INHERENT JURISDICTION - ORDER 39, CIVIL P. C. - SCOPE - SECTION 151, CIVIL P. C. - EXERCISE OF INHERENT JURISDICTION - CONDITIONS - INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN WITHDRAWAL OF MONEY FROM BANK ACCOUNT - JUSTIFICATION.

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff, a building contractor, filed a suit against the Chinese Tannery Owners' Association and its members for recovery of dues amounting to approximately two lacs of rupees for the construction of a building. The plaintiff sought a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from withdrawing money from their account with the Bank of China. The trial court granted an ad interim injunction against some of the defendants, which was later confirmed against the Association, its President, and the Chairman of the Building Committee, limiting the amount they could withdraw to two lacs and fifteen thousand rupees.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the trial court had erred in granting the injunction under Order 39, Rule 1, Civil P. C., as the provisions of Order 39 were not exhaustive and did not bar the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 151, Civil P. C. However, the court found that the trial court had not properly considered whether the land and building belonging to the Association would be sufficient to satisfy any decree that the plaintiff might obtain, and that the value of the land and building was likely to be more than sufficient to meet any such decree.

Issues: 1. Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to grant an injunction under Order 39, Rule 1, Civil P. C., in the circumstances of the case. 2. Whether the trial court had properly considered the availability of the land and building belonging to the Association as security for any decree that the plaintiff might obtain.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the provisions of Order 39, Civil P. C., were not exhaustive and did not bar the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 151, Civil P. C. The court found that the trial court had erred in granting the injunction under Order 39, Rule 1, Civil P. C., as the conditions for the grant of an injunction under that provision were not satisfied. 2. The court held that the trial court had not properly considered the availability of the land and building belonging to the Association as security for any decree that the plaintiff might obtain. The court found that the value of the land and building was likely to be more than sufficient to meet any such decree, and that there was therefore no justification for restraining the defendants from withdrawing money from their bank account.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal as incompetent but allowed the application under Section 115, Civil P. C., and set aside the order of injunction under its revisional jurisdiction.

DAS GUPTA, J.

( 1 ) THE appellants before us are three of 252 defendants in a suit brought by one Makhan Lai Ganguly, a building contractor. The suit was brought on a claim of a little less than two lacs of rupees said to be due on account of the costs of construction of a. building and costs of materials supplied, after giving full credit for three lacs seventy four thousand and sixty three rupees said to have been received from the Chinese Tannery Owners' Association, appellant No. 1 before us and defendant No. 2 in the suit. Defendant No. 3 is the President of the Chinese Tannery Owners' Association while defendant No. 4 is the Chairman of the building Committee. The plaintiff prayed for a temporary injunction restraining all the defendants from drawing on their account with deft. 1, Bank of China. An 'ad interim' injunction was at first granted against defendants Nos. 1 to 10. Finally, after hearing objections raised by these defendants the learned Subordinate Judge confirmed the injunction as against defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 and directed that they were not to withdraw money in their accounts with defendant No. 1 to a limit of two lacs and fifteen thousand rupees only. The ad interim injunction which had been earlier granted against defendants Nos. 5 to 10 was discharged. The prayer for injunction was purported to have been made under Order 39, Rule 1, Civil P. C. as well as under Section 151 of the Code. One of the objections raised by the defendants was that the provisions of Order 39, Civil P. C. could not be attracted to the facts of the present case. The learned Subordinate Judge did not clearly record his decision on this question, but from what he has said in his judgment it is clear that he has passed the order mentioned above in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of the Court, and it seems reasonable to hold that the order was not passed under Order 39, Rule 1, Civil P. C. Consequently, an appeal would not lie. The Court having passed this order in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, it is still open to us to see whether we should interfere with the order, he has passed in the exercise of our jurisdiction under Section 115, Civil P. C.

( 2 ) IT is necessary to consider first the point taken by Mr. Sen on behalf of the appellants that it is not open to the Court to pass any order of injunction in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151, Civil P. C. His argument is that where the Code has clearly and fully dealt with a matter, there is no scope for any action under inherent jurisdiction. He further argues in this connection that a reading of Section 94 of the Code makes it clear that the provisions of Order 39, Civil P. C. were intended to be exhaustive as regards this matter of temporary injunction. For this proposition he has relied upon the decisions in the case of 'hemendralal ROY v. INDO SWISS TRADING CO. LTD. ', 24 Pat 496. and in the case reported in NAGABHUSHAN REDDY v. NARASAMMA, (1950) 2 Mad L J 482. Quite clearly an opposite view was taken in the Allahabad case of 'dhaneshwar NATH v. GHANSHYAM DHAR', ILR (1940) All 201. Notice must also be taken of an observation by Mookerjee J in the case of 'nirode BARANI DEBI v. CHAMATKARINI DEVYA,' 19 Cal W. N. 205. While it is true that the Court was not, in this case, directly dealing with the point whether an injunction could be granted and the observation therein might be considered obiter, there can be no doubt as to what the learned Judges thought in the matter. Their view clearly was that in a suitably case the Court could give an order of injunction in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 151; Civil P. C. even though the provisions of Order 39, C. P. C. might not give it any authority to do so.

( 3 ) THE principles that. underlie a decision of the question whether on a certain matter there are certain provisions in the Code that bar the exercise of powers under Section 151, Civil P. C. were considered by this Court






Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top