HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
HARRIES, CHAKRABARTI, BANERJEE
ASWINI KUMAR GHOSE - Appellant
Versus
ARABINDO BOSE - Respondent
Matter 190 Of 1951
Decided On : DECEMBER 21, 1951
SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES (PRACTICE IN HIGH COURTS) ACT, 1951 - SECTION 2 - RIGHT OF SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES TO PRACTISE IN HIGH COURTS - SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY - INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM 'PRACTISE' - RIGHTS OF ADVOCATES OF SUPREME COURT IN RELATION TO HIGH COURTS - DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACTING AND PLEADING - APPLICABILITY OF LOCAL RULES AND REGULATIONS - CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 2 IN RELATION TO CALCUTTA HIGH COURT - RIGHTS OF ADVOCATES OF SUPREME COURT IN CALCUTTA HIGH COURT.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, an Advocate of the Supreme Court and the Calcutta High Court, challenged the refusal of the Registrar, Original Side, Calcutta High Court, to accept a warrant of appearance filed by him on behalf of a defendant in a suit pending on the Original Side. The petitioner contended that as an Advocate of the Supreme Court, he had the right to practise in any High Court, including the Calcutta High Court, and that this right included the right to act as well as plead on the Original Side, notwithstanding the local rules and regulations of the Calcutta High Court.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that Section 2 of the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951, which confers the right on Advocates of the Supreme Court to practise in any High Court, does not confer any rights on them which are not possessed by Advocates of that Court. The Court further held that the term 'practise' as used in Section 2 must be interpreted in the context of the peculiar object of the section, which is to clothe Advocates of the Supreme Court with the right to practise in every High Court in India as of right. The Court also held that the meaning of the term 'practise' may vary according to the local rules and regulations of each High Court, and that in the case of the Calcutta High Court, the right of an Advocate of the Supreme Court to practise is limited to acting and pleading on the Appellate Side and pleading on the Original Side, but does not include the right to act on the Original Side or appear on that side without the intervention of an attorney.
Issues: 1. Whether Section 2 of the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951 confers on Advocates of the Supreme Court the right to practise in any High Court, including the Calcutta High Court, irrespective of the local rules and regulations of that Court? 2. Whether the term 'practise' as used in Section 2 includes both acting and pleading, or whether it has a narrower meaning depending on the context and the local rules and regulations of the High Court concerned?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 2 of the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951 does not confer on Advocates of the Supreme Court any rights which are not possessed by Advocates of the High Court concerned. The section only removes the disability of Advocates of the Supreme Court from practising in High Courts of which they are not Advocates. 2. The term 'practise' as used in Section 2 must be interpreted in the context of the peculiar object of the section, which is to clothe Advocates of the Supreme Court with the right to practise in every High Court in India as of right. The meaning of the term 'practise' may vary according to the local rules and regulations of each High Court.
Final Decision: The Court discharged the Rule issued by it, holding that the petitioner had no right to act on the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court or appear on that side without the intervention of an attorney.
( 1 ) THIS Rule under Article 226 of the Constitution India was issued at the instance of two petitioners, one of whom may, for all practical purposes, be left out off account. The first petitioner is one Mr. Aswini Kumar Ghose who, besides being an Advocate of this Court entitled to practise both on the Original and the Appellate Side, is also an Advocate of the Supreme Court. The second petitioner is one Jnanendra Nath Chatterjee who is the defendant in a suit pending on the Original Side of this Court and on whose behalf the first petitioner made an attempt to file a "warrant of power and appearance". It is alleged that the said warrant was at first received by an Assistant in the Suit Registry Department, but was subsequently returned by the first respondent, who is the Suit Registrar in the Order Department of the Original Side, with the endorsement that it "must be filed by an Attorney of this Court under High Court Rules and Orders, Original Side and not by an Advocate". That allegation has not been denied.
( 2 ) THE second respondent to the petition is the Registrar, Original Side. Against him it is not alleged that he interfered with the first petitioner in any way in his attempt to file a warrant of appearance on the present occasion, but it is said that he did so on a previous occasion when he refused to accept a warrant filed by the first petitioner in a Company matter and also that he, by certain letters, communicated certain administrative decisions of this Court taken on an application made by another Advocate of the Supreme Court. Those allegations also have not been denied.
( 3 ) FROM what has been stated above, it is clear that the real matter sought to be agitated in the present proceeding is the alleged right of the first petitioner to 'act' in the second petitioner's suit and that the latter has joined in the petition only as a person interested in the establishment of that right.
( 4 ) THE Rule was issued by Bose, J. , but as the learned Judge thought that the matter could be more advantageously heard by a larger Bench, he subsequently made a report to the Chief Justice to that effect under Chapter V, Rule 2 of the Original Side Rules. Thereupon the present Special Bench was constituted for hearing the matter.
( 5 ) ALTHOUGH the terms in which the Rule was issued are extremely wide, in the course of his argument before us, the first petitioner, who appeared in person, sought to make only a short and limited point. The Rule requires the respondents to show cause why an order or direction in the nature of an appropriate writ should not be issued for the enforcement of a fundamental right of the first petitioner, "to wit, the right to practise, that is, to act and plead on the Original Side of this Court", as conferred on him by Act XVIII (18) of 1951 and guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India, as amended by Section 3 (1) (b) of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 and why consequential orders should not be made, declaring the right of the first petitioner "to act as well as plead without intervention of any attorney on' behalf of his clients on the Original Side of this Court", directing the warrant of appearance to be accepted and "upholding the right" of the second petitioner "to be defended. . . . . . . . . . . . by qualified empowered counsel of his choice". The variety of the consequential orders prayed for presents no complications, for if the first petitioner succeeded in establishing the right claimed by him, they would have all to be made, from whichever of the two alleged sources the right might be shown to flow. But as regards the source, the argument addressed to us made no reference to the alleged fundamental right and, in my opinion, the first petitioner was well-advised in avoiding it. Fundamental rights are rights which all citizens of India have by virtue of being such citizens. It could certainly not be said that any citizen of India had
AI
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.