The West Bengal Bargadars Act, 1950, is constitutional and the procedure prescribed thereunder is not unreasonable. The Board has exclusive jurisdiction in every dispute between the landowner and Bargadar with regard to the division or delivery of the produce and with regard to the termination of or restoration to cultivation of land by the Bargadar.

( 1 ) THIS is an application by the owner of certain agricultural lands for setting aside the decision of the Conciliation Board and of the Appellate Officer under the West Bengal Bargadars Act, 1950. The application is made under Article 227 of the Constitution. A rule was obtained by the petitioner against the respondent Bargadar or Bhagchasi to show cause why the order complained of should not be set aside.

( 2 ) THE learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has raised four important issues in this application. His first contention is that the West Bengal Bargadars Act (Act II (2) of 1950) is ultra vires the Constitution. His second contention is that in any event the procedure prescribed by the Bargadars Act is ultra vires the Constitution. His third contention is that as the petitioner terminated the cultivation of the lands by the Bargadar and rightly or wrongly got into possession, the Board had no jurisdiction to restore the Bhagchasi to possession of lands and to compel the delivery of paddy grown by the petitioner to the respondent Bhagchasi. Lastly, it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the order of the Board was beyond the time limited by the rules and is therefore void.

( 3 ) FOR the proper determination of these important points, it is necessary to set out very briefly the relevant facts. On the 11th October, 1950, the respondent Bhagchasi filed an application before the Bhagchasi Conciliation Board of Janka Khedri in the District of Midnapore. His case there was that he had been cultivating the lands as the petitioner's Bhagchasi. It was further alleged by him that he cultivated the land of Schedule "ka" in 1357 B. S. and after finishing work of cultivation there, when he was about to begin cultivation in another land of Schedule "kha", the petitioner terminated the Bargadar's cultivation of this "kha" Schedule land. The petitioner filed his written objection before the Board and his case was that the Bhagchasi had never cultivated the "kha" Schedule land in question and it was cultivated by the petitioner himself in 1357 B. S. with the help of his own labourers. It was also the petitioner's case that the Bhagchasi cultivated the other "ka" Schedule land as petitioner's Bhagchasi in the two previous years, namely, 1355 and 1356 B. S. but as he failed to deliver the petitioner's share of the produce the petitioner terminated such cultivation by the Bargadar and himself cultivated the land in 1357 B. S.

( 4 ) ON the 30th November, 1950, when the case was fixed for hearing by the Board there was an application by the petitioner for adjournment which the Board refused. On that date the case was heard ex parte and on that date an order was made allowing restoration of the cultivation of both the lands from 1358 B. S. and allowing the Bhagchasi to harvest the crops of 1357 on the lands of both the schedules on certain terms. Then the petitioner took an appeal to the Appellate Officer who by his order dated the 23rd December, 1950 confirmed the Board's decision and rejected the appeal of the petitioner. The rule is directed against this order of the Appellate Officer.

( 5 ) THE findings of fact appearing from the order of the Appellate Officer should be set out as I do not propose to disturb such findings of fact in my superintending jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.

( 6 ) I will briefly summarise such findings. First, it is admitted by the petitioner that the respondents cultivated these "ka" Schedule lands upto 1356 B. S. The petitioner denied that the Bhagchasis cultivated such lands in 1357 B. S. but the Board found on evidence that the Bhagchasis did actually cultivate these lands even in 1357 B. S. There is also this incontrovertible fact that the cultivation of the lands (of both the Schedules) by the Bargadar was not terminated under any order of the Board as required by the proviso to Section 5 (1) of the Bargadar Act. The one other fact which