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1951 Supreme(Cal) 63

HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
P. B. Mukharji
SRI MAHADEB JIEW - Appellant
Versus
B. B. SEN - Respondent
Civil Suit 4003  Of  1950
Decided On : FEBRUARY 23, 1951

Advocates Appeared:
R.Goho, SUBIMAL C.ROY

The provisions of Order 25 Rule 1 (3), Civil P. C. are exhaustive on the matters in respect of which it declares the law and the effect of applying the provisions of Section 151, which no doubt are very wide, to matters in respect of which the Code declares the law would be to extend the scope of the section in a manner which was not intended by the Legislature.

Headnote:

SECURITY FOR COSTS - WOMAN PLAINTIFF - INHERENT JURISDICTION - ORDER 25 RULE 1 (3), CIVIL P. C. - CONSTITUTIONALITY - ARTICLE 15 (1) OF THE CONSTITUTION.

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff Ratanbala Dasi, a woman, filed a suit to set aside a consent decree and for certain declarations and injunctions. The defendant Balkrishna Vyas applied for security for costs against the plaintiff Ratanbala Dasi under Order 25 Rule 1 (3), Civil P. C. The plaintiff Ratanbala Dasi opposed the application on the grounds that (1) the suit was not for money and therefore did not come within the rule, (2) she was not the sole plaintiff in the suit, and (3) the court had no inherent jurisdiction to order security for costs against her.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the suit was not for money and therefore did not come within the rule. The court also held that the plaintiff Ratanbala Dasi was not the sole plaintiff in the suit and therefore Order 25 Rule 1 (3), Civil P. C. did not apply. The court further held that it had no inherent jurisdiction to order security for costs against the plaintiff Ratanbala Dasi because the provisions of Order 25 Rule 1 (3), Civil P. C. were exhaustive on the matters in respect of which it declared the law.

Issues: 1. Whether Order 25 Rule 1 (3), Civil P. C. applies to a suit which is not for money? 2. Whether Order 25 Rule 1 (3), Civil P. C. applies to a suit where there is more than one plaintiff? 3. Whether the court has inherent jurisdiction to order security for costs against a plaintiff?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. Order 25 Rule 1 (3), Civil P. C. applies only to suits for money. 2. Order 25 Rule 1 (3), Civil P. C. does not apply to a suit where there is more than one plaintiff. 3. The court has no inherent jurisdiction to order security for costs against a plaintiff where there is an express provision in the Code or a necessary implication from the Code.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the application for security for costs.

P. B. MUKHARJI, J.

( 1 ) THIS is an application for security for costs against pltf. Ratanbala Dasi in the suit.

( 2 ) THERE are two pltfs. in this suit. One is Sri Sri Mahadeb Jiew, a deity who is suing through Ratanbala as his trustee or as shebait. The other pltf. is Ratanbala Dasi herself.

( 3 ) MR. R. Goho, who argued in support of this application, has put forward two main grounds: (1) Pltf. Ratanbala is a woman and therefore under Order 25 Rule 1 (3) I have the jurisdiction to order security for costs against the woman pltf. , if I am otherwise satisfied. (2) Pltf. Ratanbala is merely a puppet in this suit and she is not the real litigant and therefore I should direct security for costs as against her. This power, Mr. Goho argues, is within the inherent powers and jurisdiction of this Court.

( 4 ) I will first deal with the ground put forward by Mr. Goho on the basis of Order 25 Rule 1, Civil P. C. In my opinion, before an order can be made under this provision of the Code, the applicant has to satisfy four tests. The first is that it must be a suit for money. I have carefully analysed the plaint in this suit and I find that there is no prayer or claim in this suit for any money whatsoever. It is a suit to set aside a consent decree and for certain declarations and injunction. Mr. Goho submits that in the last analysis these suits are really for money but I am not prepared to accept so commercial a view of suits. I have no hesitation in holding that the present suit before me is not a suit for money at all. It is quite true that when a suit is perhaps not exclusively for money but will result in a decree for money then such a suit may come within the rule on the basis of the decision in 'sonabai v. Tribhowandas', (32 Bom 602 ). But I have no hesitation in holding that the main relief, at any rate, must be for money before a suit can come within the meaning of this provision. In my opinion, the applicant in this case has failed to pass this test.

( 5 ) THE second test is that the woman pltf. should be the sole pltf. within the meaning of this rule. I find that the deity is a co-pltf. in this case. It is true that pltf. Ratanbala is the next friend of the deity but she is also a she-bait and a trustee under the terms of the Will of the Testatrix. If she cannot act as a shebait or the next friend, then she will be removed and somebody else will have to be appointed as next friend to carry on the suit on behalf of the pltf. deity. It is not the same thing as saying that it is one and the same pltf. and that is the woman pltf. Ratanbala. The deity is a separate pltf. in this suit.

( 6 ) THIS point did arise for decision in a Calcutta case which was decided by Panckridge, J. There it was held that where only one of several pltfs. is a woman, Order 25, Rule 1 (3) has no application. The case is reported as 'victor Day v. Nissim Aaron (Judah)', (63 Cal 809 ). There also, there were two plfs. , one a minor and the other his mother. Panckridge, J. at p. 811 of the report observes:"in my opinion, Order XXV Imposes an exceptional disability upon pltfs. and therefore must be strictly construed. It is not to be applied if the circumstances do not clearly come within its purview. I do not think that a suit in which there is a male pltf. can properly be described a suit in which the pltf. is a woman. "

( 7 ) THE learned Judge proceeds to give further reasons on the basis of the consequence that would follow if this contention was upheld. On the same page he further observes:"under Rule 2 (1), if the security is not furnished within the time fixed, the Court shall make an order dismissing the suit, unless the pltf. or pltfs. are permitted to withdraw therefrom. The language on the face of it applies to the suit as a whole and the form of the summons bears this out because it asks that an order for security be made against both the pltfs. In his argument, however, the deft's counsel has conceded that no order can be made as against































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