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1951 Supreme(Cal) 27

HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Harries, Banerjee
SATYENDRA CHANDRA SEN - Appellant
Versus
S. B. TRADING CO. LTD. - Respondent
Appln.  2218  Of  1949
Decided On : JANUARY 22, 1951

Advocates Appeared:
A.DATTA, A.K.SEN

The court has the discretion to rescind or vary decrees and orders under Section 6 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Amendment Act, 1950, and it will not exercise this discretion in favor of tenants who have given an undertaking to vacate the premises.

Headnote:

WEST BENGAL PREMISES RENT CONTROL (TEMPORARY PROVISIONS) AMENDMENT ACT, 1950 - SECTION 6 - COURT'S DISCRETION TO RESCIND OR VARY DECREES AND ORDERS - INTERPRETATION OF 'MAY' - TENANT'S UNDERTAKING TO VACATE PREMISES - EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS.

Fact of the Case:

Tenants sought relief under Section 6 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Amendment Act, 1950, to rescind an ejectment decree passed against them. They had earlier given an undertaking to vacate the premises within 14 days of abandoning their appeal to the Supreme Court.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the word 'may' in Section 6 confers a discretion on the court to rescind or vary decrees and orders. The court found that it would be inequitable to allow the tenants to take advantage of the new Act since they had given an undertaking to vacate the premises.

Issues: 1. Whether the word 'may' in Section 6 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Amendment Act, 1950 should be interpreted as 'shall'. 2. Whether the tenants were entitled to the benefit of Section 6 despite their undertaking to vacate the premises.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court interpreted the word 'may' in Section 6 as conferring a discretion on the court to rescind or vary decrees and orders. The court relied on the general scheme of the legislation and the surrounding circumstances to arrive at this interpretation. 2. The court held that it would be inequitable to allow the tenants to take advantage of the new Act since they had given an undertaking to vacate the premises. The court reasoned that the landlord had a legitimate expectation that the tenants would fulfill their undertaking and that allowing them to take advantage of the new Act would be unjust.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the tenants' application for relief under Section 6 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Amendment Act, 1950.

BANERJEE, J.

( 1 ) THIS is an appln. by the tenants claiming relief Under Section 6, West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Amendment Act, 1950. That section is as follows:"power of Court to rescind or vary decrees and orders in certain cases. Where at any time between the commencement of the said Act and of this Act, an order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises has been made or passed by any Court but possession of such premises has not been recovered in execution of such order or decree and the Court is of opinion that the order or decree would not have been made or passed if this Act had been in force when the order or decree was made or passed, the Court may, on appln. by the tenant within sixty days of the commencement of this Act, rescind or vary the order or decree on such terms and conditions as it deems necessary for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Section 18 of the said Act as amended by this Act. "

( 2 ) THE "said Act" in the section is the "west Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1950.

( 3 ) THE facts of this case appear from the judgment of P. B. Mukharji J. , which is reported in S. B. Trading Co. Ltd. v. Satyendra Chandra, 86 C. L. J. 46. The pltf. filed the suit for ejectment, arrears of rent and mesne profits. His allegation in the plaint was that the defts. (tenants) had failed to pay or deposit in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1948, rent payable by them in respect of the premises in question which had accrued due after the commencement of the Act of 1948 and as such their interest in the premises was ipso facto determined and they should no longer be deemed to be tenants. According to the pltf. the defts. were trespassers and liable to be ejected forthwith.

( 4 ) THE defts. filed their written statement in which they denied that they had made any default in payment of rent which resulted in the determination of their interest in the premises. But ultimately they abandoned this defence and the only relief they claimed was Under Section 18 (5) of the Act of 1950. The defts expressly agreed that if their claim under that section failed they would have no other defence to the suit and the judgment must go against them as a matter of course.

( 5 ) IT will be convenient to set out here Section 18 (5) of the Act of 1950. It runs as follows:"if at the date when this Act comes into force, a suit for ejectment of a tenant is pending whether in trial Court or first or second appeal in which no decree for ejectment would be passed except on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948, the Court shall exercise the powers of granting relief against ejectment given by Section 14 of this Act following the provisions and procedure of that section as far as may be necessary, and for the said purpose shall make such order for amendment of pleadings, production of evidence, remand, payment of costs as may be necessary or just. "

( 6 ) WHEN the suit came up for hearing before P. B. Mukharji J. , he, having regard to the views he expressed on Section 18 (5) in another case, held that the defts. were not tenants within the meaning of Section 18 (5) and as such were not entitled to the benefit of the section. But another learned Judge of this Court in construing Section 18 (1) of the Act of 1950 had taken a view which was in conflict with the view expressed by P. B. Mukharji J. Having regard to this conflict of opinion, Mukherjee J. , thought that the matter being of public importance should be heard by a Bench of this Court and accordingly this case was refd. under Ch. 5 Rule 3 of our Original Side Rules to my Lord, the Chief Justice, for constituting a Bench. A Bench was constituted and the case was heard and I delivered judgment in the suit which is reported in 86 C. L. J. 46 at p. 61 We took the same view as was taken by P. B. Mukharji J. and held that










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