The power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution includes the power to require that the facts be fully investigated and fairly found, and when found, fairly considered after giving the parties a proper opportunity to explain them.

( 1 ) THIS Rule raises a fundamental question under the West Bengal Bargadars Act, 1950. It was contended that a Conciliation, Board established under the Act or an Appellate Officer appointed under it, was not a 'tribunal' within the meaning of Article 227 of the Constitution and therefore this Court had no jurisdiction under the Article to interfere with a decision of either of those authorities. The Rule was issued under Article 227 and is directed against certain orders passed under the Bargadars Act.

( 2 ) IF We could accept the contention as correct, it would obviously be unnecessary to proceed further and refer at all to the facts of the case. But as, in our opinion, the contention is not sound, it is necessary to state the facts.

( 3 ) THE opposite party is an inhabitant of village Sudhangsupur in the District of 24 Parganas and the petitioner is a Nayeb in the employment of the Sir Daniel Hamilton Estate which owns an extensive area of 'khas' lands in the locality. On the 16th April, 1950, the opposite party made an application to the Goseba Bhagchas Conciliation Board in which he stated that the petitioner had declined to allow him to continue his cultivation of about 15 Bighas of land which he had been cultivating under the Bhag system for the last 16 or 18 years. It was prayed that suitable orders might be passed which would enable him to continue such cultivation. The case of the opposite party was that the applicant had been cultivating the lands, not under the Bhag system but as a labourer, paid for his labour in money, and that he had been doing so under written agreements, executed annually. It was accordingly contended that the applicant was not a bargadar, as defined in the Act and the dispute was not one within the jurisdiction of the Board. This contention was given effect to by the Board which found that the agreement for the previous year, which was admitted by the applicant made no reference to his receiving a share of the produce but on the other hand, the endorsements of payment on the agreement, which also were admitted, showed that he had received payments in money or in paddy in lieu of money on various dates, as his wages. It was accordingly held, that the opposite party was not a Bargadar and in that view his application was rejected.

( 4 ) THE opposite party then appealed to the Appellate Officer who reversed the decision of the Board. The, Appellate Officer held that although according to the terms of the agreement, the Opposite Party could certainly not be held to be a Bargadar, yet section 18 of the Act entitled him to go behind the written contract and give effect to the real relationship between the parties, He found such relationship to be that "between a Landowner and his Bargadar", relying on certain papers he had called for from the petitioner at the instance of the Opposite Party and also what he referred to as "common knowledge" about the origin of the contract system introduced in the Estate. In the result, he declared the Opposite Party to be a Bargadar and remanded the case to the Board with a direction to pass the actual order for possession after taking into consideration certain circumstances.

( 5 ) THE petitioner then moved this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution and obtained the present Rule.

( 6 ) IN support of his preliminary objection, Dr. Sen Gupta contended that a Board constituted under the Bargadars Act was only a body of arbitrators and in no sense a tribunal. According to him, "tribunals", as contemplated by Article. 237 of the Constitution, were not something different from Courts and the term had been added only in order to cover bodies or authorities who were in fact Courts, but were yet not called by that name. A Board under the Bargadars Act, it was contended, was not a tribunal, because it was not a Court and it was not a Court, because it was not bound to hear evidence. Dr. Sen Gupta admitted that the absence of an obligation to