P. B. MUKHARJI, J.

( 1 ) THIS is a suit for the recovery of premises No. 47a, Ripon Street, Calcutta, on the ground that the plffs. bona fide require the said premises for their own use and occupation and for the purpose of building and re-building.

( 2 ) THE defence taken in the written statement is two-fold: one is that the lease was for manufacturing purposes, and the other is a denial of the bona fide requirement of the plffs. upon the grounds mentioned in the plaint.

( 3 ) MR. Modak, learned junior of Mr. Meyer, raised two issues as follows: 1. Was the lease for manufacturing purposes? 2. Do the plffs. require the premises bona fide - (a) for their own use and occupation; (b) for building and re-building? These issues have been accepted by Mr. S. K. Basu appearing for the plffs.

( 4 ) EVIDENCE has been adduced on behalf of the plffs. The first witness was Uma Prasanna Mukherji, the son of plff. 1 Sati Prasanna Mukherji; and the next witness was the plff. Debi Prasanna Mukherji, and the third witness was Sachin Bhattacharya, an employee of the plffs.

( 5 ) I will take issue No. 2 first for consideration because I consider the evidence is all one way under this issue, and that is in favour of the plffs.

( 6 ) ORIGINALLY premises No. 47 Ripon Street, was one entire property, which has now been sub-divided into two portions marked 47'a' and 47'b'. There was a partition proceeding between the plffs. and No. 47b, Ripon Street has been allotted to the plff. Durga Prasanna. 47'a' Ripon Street has been allotted to the plffs. Nos 1. 2. 4 and 5. Plffs. 1, 2, 4 and 5 have no house to live in Calcutta, and I am satisfied on the evidence that they bona fide require the said premises for their own use and occupation and for the purpose of building and rebuilding. (After discussion of the evidence the judgment proceeds:) I therefore, hold that the plffs. bona fide require the said premises for their own occupation and for building and re-building and I answer issue No. 2 in the affirmative.

( 7 ) MR. Meyer has mainly defended the suit on issue No. 1. His submission is that the notice in this case is bad and insufficient on the ground that the lease was for manufacturing purposes.

( 8 ) THE facts of the case may be briefly stated: There was a lease dated 18-4-1929, in favour of the defendant for twenty years, which expired on 30-4-1946. The lease is an exhibit and appears in the agreed brief of documents, which has been marked by consent as Ex. A. On the expiry of the lease it is the pltfs' case that the deft was allowed to remain as a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 175/-according to the English calendar month until the notice dated 8-3-1948, which is also to be found in the brief of documents. The notice to quit asked the deft, to vacate on the expiry of the month of March 1948.

( 9 ) THE evidence on the point so far as is material has been on the following lines. The lease was taken by the deft, for various purposes, mainly for residential purpose of the deft, himself and for the purpose of setting up a printing press and for ordinary business purposes. It is denied on behalf of the plffs. that the lease was for manufacturing, purpose. (After discussion of the evidence the judgment pr6ceeds): I am not satisfied with the evidence that the deft, gave and the method and manner of his giving evidence, and the deft's demeanour has left this 'impression in my mind that the defence of manufacturing lease was a last minute and inspired defence and was not a genuine and bona fide defence. Mr. Meyer for the deft, realised this difficulty and confined himself mostly to a question of the construction of the lease and of Section 106, T. P. Act.

( 10 ) THE relevant clause in the lease is to be found in Clause 2, the material portion of which runs as follows: "i shall pay the rent Rs. 175/- per month according to the English calendar month and I shall occupy the same for dwelling purpose, for setting up a press and for ordinary business pur

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