The successor of the presiding officer has the authority to make orders under Section 151, Civil P. C. and the court may restore a case under Section 174(3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act even if an appeal lies against the dismissal order.

( 1 ) THIS application is direct, ed against an order setting aside under Section 151, Civil P. C. , an order of dismissal of an application under Section 174 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act.

( 2 ) IT appears that the application for setting aside the sale was put up before the Munsif on 1st March 1947, and on that date, hearing was adjourned to 28th April 1947, "for orders awaiting reciept of the record from the appellate Court. " The case was, however, never put up on 28th April because on an earlier date it was dismissed for default. The circumstances under which it was dismissed for default are peculiar. It appears that after the Court had, on 1st March 1947, adjourned the case to 28th April 1947, the records on being received from the High Court were put up before the Munsif on 14th March 1947. On that date, apparently in the absence of either party, the Munsif passed the following orders:"applicants are directed to take necessary steps for service of fresh notice upon opposite parties Nos. 4 and 9 by 19-3-47. Put up on that date for farther orders. Inform. "

( 3 ) ACCORDINGLY, on 19th March 1947, the record was put up before the Munsif and the following order was passed:"no further steps taken by the applicants and the Order No. 40 of 14-3-47 has not been complied with. Ordered that the Miscellaneous Case be dismissed for default. "

( 4 ) IT was in these circumstances that an application under Section 151, Civil P. C. , was filed by the applicant praying for restoration of the miscellaneous case, that is to say, the case started on the application under Section 174 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, after vacating the order passed on 19th March 1947.

( 5 ) ON 12th June 1948, this application for restoration was allowed by the learned Munsif and as stated above the dismissal order passed on 19th March 1947, was set aside.

( 6 ) IN support of the present application, it is argued, in the first place, that an appeal lay under the provisions of Section 174 (5), Bengal Tenancy Act against the order of dismissal for default and consequently "the Court acted illegally in the exercise of jurisdiction in allowing the application under Section 151, Civil P. C. Secondly, it ia argued that the Munsif, who passed the order of dismissal for default, having ceased to be the presiding officer of the Court, his successor is office was not entitled in law to give any relief under the provisions of Section 151, Civil P. C.

( 7 ) TAKING the second point first, we are unable to agree that any such limitation, as suggested by the learned Advocate, can be placed in the way of the Court making orders under Section 151, Civil P. C. What this section lays down is this:"nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice, or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. "

( 8 ) THE fact that one officer has ceased to preside over a Court and is succeeded by another gentleman does not mean that the Court has ceased to exist, or that the Court is another Court. It is the Court, which in the exercise of its inherent power, can, and where necessary should, make orders for the ends of justice. There seems no reason why we should limit this power given by the Legislature to the Court by laying down that it is only when the same presiding officer continues that an order already passed can be altered. Reliance was placed by the learned advocate on the decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Bisheshwar Pratap Narain Sahi v. Asarfi Singh, 74 I. C. 110: (A. I. R, (11) 1924 Pat. 136 ). In that case a decree had been passed declaring that the plaintiffs were entitled to, among other things, profits with respect to properties of schedule IV, but subject to the decision of the Privy Council, for three years before suit and for subsequent period until delivery of possession, or three years after the decree whatever event first occurre