An accused person is not required to prove the truth of the allegations but only that there were reasonable grounds for believing in the allegations and that the accusations were made in good faith to lawful authority.

( 1 ) THE petitioner has been convicted of having defamed the complainant and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. He has been sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 200/- in default to undergo simple imprisonment for three months.

( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this case briefly are as follows: There was a meeting held in the Paikpara area by the local residents to consider the conduct of the residents of No. 6 Raja Manindra Road. These residents were Radhanath Ghose, one Muktakeshi and a young girl named Panchi alias Puspa. After the meeting some 42 members of the locality presented a petition to the Deputy Commissioner of Police stating that Radhanath Ghose was living an immoral life and that Muktakeshi was not his wife but his mistress and further that they were using the girl Puspa as a prostitute and living on her earnings. The police made an enquiry but declined to take action. Thereafter Radhanath Ghose filed a petition before the Chief. Presidency Magistrate charging six persons, some of whom were signatories and others not, with having defamed him by alleging that he was living with a person who was not his wife and by alleging that he was living on the immoral earnings of Puspa. He stated that Muktakeshi was his wife and Puspa was his daughter through Muktakeshi. He denied that Puspa was being prostituted. Upon this complaint being filed only two persons were summoned namely Tolaram Bothra and the petitioner Ramesh Chandra Roy. Tolaram has been acquitted but Ramesh has been convicted. The defence of Ramesh was that the allegations were true and that he acted in good faith when he made an accusation against the complainant to the police. On his behalf the provisions of the Eighth Exception of Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code were relied upon. Evidence was given by the complainant and also on behalf of the accused petitioner. The learned Magistrate after considering the evidence has convicted the petitioner who has now obtained this Rule.

( 3 ) THE learned Advocate for the petitioner urges that the learned Magistrate has entirely misconceived the import of the Eighth Exception of Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code and that his misconception has misled him into convicting the accused. He further says that the learned Magistrate has rejected the defence evidence on grounds which are not tenable and upon the assumption of certain facts regarding which there is no evidence.

( 4 ) IN my opinion the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner are sound. A part of the case made out by the defence has been virtually accepted by the learned Magistrate. He has found that Muktakeshi is not the wife but the mistress of Radhanath Ghose and that Puspa is not Radhanath's daughter but the daughter of Muktakeshi by her husband since deceased. He has therefore disbelieved the evidence of the prosecution in this respect. In discussing the ground taken by the defence namely that the case fell within the Eight Exception of Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code the learned Magistrate has fallen into serious error. Exception VIII is in these terms. "it is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject-matter of accusation". It is quite clear from the wording of this Exception that an accused person is not bound to prove that the allegations made by him are true. It is sufficient if he proves that on reasonable grounds he believed the allegations to be true and in that belief he made the accusation to the lawful authority mentioned in the Exception. This principle has been laid down as long ago as 1878 in the case of 'shibo Prosad Pandah, 4 Cal. 124' where Markby and Prinsep JJ. held that. "the proper point to be decided is not whether the allegations put forward by the accused in support of the defamation are in substance true but whether he was informed and had good reason