Nylon or rayon warpsheets do not fall under Entry 68 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, as they are not 'goods' within the meaning of the Entry. Even if the warpsheets come under Entry 68, the respondent company is entitled to the exemption of excise duty as a 'job work' in accordance with the Notification dated April 30, 1975 of the Ministry of Finance, Government of India.

( 1 ) IN this appeal, the Collector of Central Excise and others have challenged the propriety of the Judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court making the Rule NISI obtained by the respondent company Madura Coats Ltd. , absolute.

( 2 ) THE case of the respondent is that it is required by some of its customers, such as Dunlop India Limited, to arrange nylon or rayon yarns supplied by them in parallel rows loosely held together by cotton varns sun plied by the respondent. Such arrangement of rayon or nylon cards is called a tyrecord warpsheet. To make a warpsheet, the respondent first winds the nylon or rayon yarns supplied by its customers into bobbins. The yarns are then twisted in a twisting machine and thereafter used as warps on a loom; the cotton yarns being used at widely spaced intervals as wefts to hold the nylon or rayon yarns in position. A given length of warpsheet will have 99'4% of nylon yarns and 9. 8% of cotton yarns. No manufacturing process involved in making warpsheets and no new commodity known to commerce or industry comes into being when yarns are arranged or assembled to form warpsheets. A warpsheet continues to be known as yarns commercially and in industry even after the arrangement mentioned above. The nylon or rayon yarns in the warpsheets are used by the respondent's customers in the manufacture of motor car tyres, and it is convenient in such manufacture to have the yarns arranged or assembled in the form of a warpsheet. The cotton yarns holding the nylon or rayon together are destroyed in the manufacture of tyres and are not necessary for such manufacture, their only use or function being to hold the arrangement or assemblage of nylon or rayon yarns together.

( 3 ) THE Collector of Central Excise by his memo dated March 24, 1975 addressed to the respondent had taken the view that a flylon or rayon warpsheet is an item of manufacture by itself and as it does not come under any of the Tariff Entries Nos. 1 to 66 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, it will come under the residuary Entry 68 as "goods, not elsewhere specified" and liable to duty at the rate of 1% ad valorem. In that view of the matter, the Central Excise Authorities have been demanding payment of excise duty from the respondent for the nylon and rayon warpsheets. The respondent has since paid such duty under protest for the period between March 24, 1975 and May 7, 1975.

( 4 ) ON April 30, 1975, the Central Government issued a notification exempting goods mentioned under Entry 68 of the First Schedule manufactured in a factory as a 'job work' from so much of the excise duty leviable thereon as was in excess of the duty calculated on the basis of the amount charged for the job work. The Central Excise Authorities also have taken a view that the respondent is not entitled to the exemption of duty on the basis that the job that is done by the respondent amounts to job work. According to them as the warpsheets consist of cotton yarns which are supplied by the respondent's customers their contention was that in any event it was only liable to pay duty on the basis of job work. The refund claimed by the respondent was also rejected by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise. The respondent has filed appeals against the orders of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise rejecting its claim for refund. It is contended that such appeals and applications for refund are not adequate alternative legal remedies inasmuch as the respondent will have to continue to pay excise duty pending the disposal of such appeals or applications and will have to continually file appeals and applications for refund each time the respondent is assessed to duty and compelled to pay the same. Accordingly, the respondent moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for the quashing of the said orders dated March 24, 1975 and February 6, 1966. The respondent has also prayed for a Writ in the nature