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1989 Supreme(Cal) 187
High Court Of Calcutta
A. M. BHATTACHARJEE, A. K. NANDI
PRATIMA PAUL - Appellant
Versus
COMPETENT AUTHORITY - Respondent
C. O. 2279 Of 1985
Decided On : 04/12/1989
DEBNARAYAN BERA, JYOTIRMOY BHATTACHARYA, PRAFULLA KUMAR GHOSH, SWADESH BHUSAN BHUNIA, TAPAN KUMAR SEN GUPTA
The interpretation of the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, particularly the definition of 'vacant land' in Section 2 (q), the entitlement of members of a Hindu Undivided Family to separate ceiling limits under Section 4 (7), and the interpretation of the definition of 'person' and 'family' in Sections 2 (i) and 2 (f) respectively.
Headnote:
URBAN LAND (CEILING AND REGULATION) ACT, 1976 - SECTION 2 (Q) - VACANT LAND - SECTION 4 (7) - HINDU UNDIVIDED FAMILY - SECTION 6 EXPLANATION (II) - VACANT LAND - SECTION 2 (F) - FAMILY - ARTICLE 14 - DISCRIMINATION - ARTICLE 227 - WRIT PETITION - VESTING OF LAND - CEILING LIMIT - AGRICULTURAL LAND - CULTIVATION - NON-USER - REASONABLE INTERPRETATION - GOVERNMENT CIRCULAR - INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES - PURPOSE OF THE ACT - POVERTY AS A FACTOR - UNDIVIDED FAMILY OF NON-HINDUS - INTERPRETATION OF DEFINITION OF 'PERSON' AND 'FAMILY' - CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 4 (7) - INTENTIONAL CESSATION OF CULTIVATION - UNINTENTIONAL CESSATION OF CULTIVATION - INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 2 (O) EXPLANATION (A) - CONVERSION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND - FACTUAL MATRIX - FINDING OF THE COURT - INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 2 (I) - DEFINITION OF 'PERSON' - HINDU UNDIVIDED FAMILY NOT A 'PERSON' - SECTION 4 (7) - SHARES OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF HINDU UNDIVIDED FAMILY - CIRCULAR LETTERS ISSUED BY GOVERNMENT OF INDIA - CLARIFICATION REGARDING DEFINITION OF 'FAMILY' AND 'PERSON' - APPLICABILITY OF CIRCULAR - WRIT PETITION ALLOWED - IMPUGNED ORDERS QUASHED.
Fact of the Case:
Petitioners, a widow and her minor children, challenged the vesting of their land under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, arguing that the land was agricultural and had not become vacant due to non-cultivation for a period of time, and that they should be treated as separate units for the purpose of ceiling limit.
Finding of the Court:
1. The land in question was agricultural and had not become vacant due to non-cultivation for a period of time, as the non-cultivation was due to circumstances beyond the petitioners' control, such as financial difficulty. 2. The petitioners, as members of a Hindu Undivided Family, were entitled to separate ceiling limits under Section 4 (7) of the Act, and could not be treated as one unit for the purpose of ceiling limit.
Issues: 1. Whether the land in question was vacant land within the meaning of Section 2 (q) of the Act. 2. Whether the petitioners, as members of a Hindu Undivided Family, were entitled to separate ceiling limits under Section 4 (7) of the Act.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the land in question was not vacant land, as the non-cultivation was due to circumstances beyond the petitioners' control, such as financial difficulty. The Court interpreted the expression "by any reason whatsoever" in Section 6 Explanation (ii) of the Act to mean that it did not include cessation of cultivation due to such circumstances. 2. The Court held that the petitioners, as members of a Hindu Undivided Family, were entitled to separate ceiling limits under Section 4 (7) of the Act, as the definition of 'person' in Section 2 (i) of the Act did not include Hindu Undivided Family. The Court also referred to Government circulars clarifying that the definition of 'family' in Section 2 (f) of the Act did not include Hindu Undivided Family.
Final Decision: The Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the impugned orders of the Competent Authority and the Appellate Authority.
( 1 ) I have had the advantage of going through the Judgment prepared by my learned brother, A. K. Nandi, J, and I agree that for the reasons stated by him we must make the Rule absolute and quash the impugned Order passed by the Competent Authority and affirmed by the Appellate Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short 'the Act' ). But in view of the importance of the two questions involved herein, I have thought it fit to add a few words, my concurrence with the view of my Lord Nandi, J. , notwithstanding.
( 2 ) THE first question arises thus. What vests under the Act is Urban vacant land and the expressions 'urban Land' as in Section 2 (q) and the expression 'vacant Land' as in Section 2 (q) have been expressly defined not, "to include any land which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture". The Explanation (B) to Section 2 (a), however, goes to show that a land, notwithstanding its actual user mainly for agricultural purposes, "shall not be deemed to be used mainly for the purpose of agriculture, if such land is not entered in the revenue or land records before the appointed day as for the purpose of agriculture". The reason behind this provision is patently obvious, the object being to forestall attempted exclusion of lands from the purview of the Act by putting the same to some sort of agricultural use in anticipation of the apprehended operation of the Act. As I had occasion to point out, speaking for a Division Bench of this Court, in Birajananda vs. Competent Authority (AIR 1988 Cal 8), referred to by Nandi, J. , in order to warrant exclusion from the operation of the Act, the land must not only be used mainly for the purpose of agriculture at the commencement of the Act, it must also be recorded as such in the relevant land-records.
( 3 ) IN the case at hard, it is not disputed that the lands in question have not only been recorded as agricultural in the relevant land-records, the same have also been used for the purpose of agriculture till 1975. From 1979, the lands have not been used for the purpose of agriculture or, for the matter of that, for any purpose and the case of the petitioners is that they could not do so because of want of fund and want of helping hand as a result of the last male-holder having died m indigent circumstances and without any adult male member to look after the lands. The respondents have held that the lands, as a result of such non-user, have become vacant land for the purpose of the Act. The Learned Counsel for the respondents has already relied on Explanation (ii) to Section 6 which provides that -"where any land, not being vacant land. . has become vacant land by any reason whatsoever". the Act shall commerce to operate in respect of such land from "the data on which such land becomes vacant land".
( 4 ) A piece of land used mainly for the purpose of agriculture, and as such out of the reach of the Act, may cease to be so used as a result of conversion, change of user and the like and may thus become a. vacant land for the purpose of the Act. But would it become so by mere non-user alone and even where, as here, such cessation of user is due to circumstances beyond the control of the land-owner? The Respondents have sought to return an affirmative answer and placing strongest possible reliance on the words "by any reason whatsoever" in Explanation (ii) to Section 6, it has been urged that if a piece of land used for the purpose of agriculture, ceases to be so used for "any reason whatsoever", including poverty or any other circumstances beyond control of the land-holder, it would cease to be agricultural land and would become Vacant land.
( 5 ) IT is true that the expression "by any reason whatsoever" may appear to be words of very wide amplitude. But gone are the days of interpreting a statute with a Lexicon in one hand and a Grammar in the other and "literal approach" to legislations is now being steadily discar
