An amendment to a plaint that seeks to incorporate a ground for eviction that is barred by a statutory provision cannot be allowed as it is an attempt to circumvent the statutory bar. Additionally, such an amendment does not alter the date of institution of the suit, and the suit remains barred by the statutory provision.

( 1 ) THIS appeal from an appellate decree has been referred to us by a learned single Judge of this court as he was unable to share the view expressed by another learned single Judge in the case of Haripada Das v. Sristidhar Chakraborty,. The present appeal arises out of a suit for eviction which was decreed by the trial court but was dismissed on an appeal by the tenant defendant. The plaintiff is the appellant now before us.

( 2 ) THE plaintiff purchased the suit premises on Dec. 2, 1975. At the time of such purchase the tenant defendant was in occupation of the suit premises as a pre-existing tenant. By a notice dated May 22, 197t, the plaintiff determined the tenancy in favour of the tenant defendant with the expiry of June 1977 and such a notice being a combined notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Properly Act and Section 13 (6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, the plaintiff instituted the suit for eviction, being Title Suit No. 560 of 1977 of the 1st Court of the learned Munsif at Sealdah on August 19, 1977. On the plaint as originally filed, such eviction was sought for on the sole ground that the tenant defendant had transferred, assigned and/or sublet portions of the ground floor to several persons without the previous consent in writing of the landlord. During the pendency of this suit on March 14, 1979, the plaintiff filed an application for amendment of the plaint under Order 6, Rule 17 read with Section 151 of Civil P. C. By the amendment, the plaintiff sought to incorporate two more additional grounds in support of her claim for eviction, namely, (i) that the plaintiff requires the suit premises for her own use and occupation, in as much as, she purchased the property with a view to reside there with the members of her family she having no other alternative suitable accommodation of her own and (ii) that the plaintiff requires the suit premises for building and rebuilding. Such an amendment was allowed by an order dated March 27, 1979.

( 3 ) THE suit was contested by the tenant defendant who denied all the material allegations made in the plaint. The allegation of subletting was specifically denied and the claim for eviction on the ground of requirement or for building and rebuilding was contested on the ground that such a claim is not bona fide and is not admissible in view of the provision of Sub-section (3a) of Section 13 of the W. B. Premises Tenancy Act.

( 4 ) ON the evidence led by the parties both the courts have concurrently overruled the plaintiff's claim of eviction based on the ground of subletting or the plaintiff's requirement for building and rebuilding. Neither of those two grounds according to the courts below could be substantiated by the plaintiff on the evidence led by her. The learned Munsif, however, decreed the suit upon a finding that the plaintiff had been able to make out the ground of reasonable requirement for her own use and occupation and for the use and occupation of the members of her family. The objection on the part of the tenant defendant that such a ground is not admissible to the plaintiff in the present suit which was filed within 3 years from the date of the plaintiff's purchase was overruled by the learned Munsif primarily relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan,. He was of the view that the application for amendment having been filed beyond 3 years from the date of the plaintiff's purchase, plaintiff's suit for eviction on the grounds incorporated by the amendment must be deemed to be instituted on the date when such an application for amendment was filed and since that was beyond 3 years from the date of purchase there was no bar to the plaintiff's getting eviction on the ground so incorporated.

( 5 ) THE tenant defendant preferred an appeal. The court of appeal, it appears, upheld the plaintiff's case of requirement for her own use and occupation particularly in view of the admissio