The Court has the discretion to determine the quantum of alimony pendente lite based on the circumstances of the case, including the income of the husband, the wife's lack of independent income, the expenses of maintaining the child, and any special circumstances.

( 1 ) IN this revisional application the wife as petitioner has impugned an order dated April 2, 1993 passed by the learned Additional District Judge 8th Court, Alipore, South 24 Parganas in Matrimonial Suit No. 24 of 1992 only as regards the quantum of alimony pendente lite for herself and her minor son. The husband brought the suit for divorce against the wife on the ground of cruelty.

( 2 ) IN the petition for divorce filing by the husband he contended that he has been living in a joint mess with his eldest brother, sister-in-law, niece and widow mother but the wife did not like to stay in a joint mess with them and insisted on his separation. He described his eldest brother as a person highly placed in life and he himself is a bank employee. Be that as it may, as and when the present petitioner claimed alimony pendente lite in the matrimonial proceeding contending inter alia that she was not possessed of sufficient means for her own maintenance and for the maintenance of the child and further alleged that the husband being a bank employee was earning about Rs. 5,228. 00 per month and claimed alimony pendente lite to the tune of Rs. 1,500. 00 for her own and Rs. 1,000. 00 for her minor child and litigation cost of Rs. 2,500. 00. The Trial Court ordered that she should get alimony pendente lite to the extent of Rs. 900. 00 only, Rs. 500. 00 for herself and Rs. 400. 00 for the minor son and the litigation cost was computed at Rs. 1,000. 00 and the husband opposite party was directed to pay the said alimony pendente lite from the date of the filing of the application by 10 equal monthly instalments. The litigation cost was directed to be paid in two monthly instalments of Rs. 500. 00.

( 3 ) ON behalf of the wife opposite party it has been contended that the amount of Rs. 900. 00 per month, Rs. 500. 00 for herself and Rs. 400. 00for the school going son, was too meagre and that it ought to be increased to such a substantial amount which would be sufficient for their maintenance and upkeep. Since the male child has started going to school and his school fees in the Kindergarten class of the school amounted to Rs. 100. 00, a sum of Rs. 400. 00 was not at all sufficient for the maintenance of the child. It has not also been proved in the Trial Court that she had any independent income of her own sufficient to meet her own expenses or she was in any part-time employment. The husband took a plea by producing the pay slip for March 1993 that his pay was Rs. 3698. 00 after making all deductions from his gross income of Rs. 5,228/ -. It has, however, not been disclosed before the Trial Court nor before us as to what the other different deductions were about and even when we wanted to know of the learned Advocate for the husband opposite party his current pay with different break ups about deductions, that was not produced before us, even though time was taken by the learned Advocate on the said account for about a week.

( 4 ) IT has been contended by Mr. Utpal Bhattacharya, the learned Advocate for the opposite party that the husband had pleaded in the petition of objection that he had to spend a sum of Rs. 700. 00per month towards the medical expenses of his ailing mother even though it was admitted that the mother earned a sum of Rs. 125. 00 as her pension. It has also transpired that the mother is living with his eldest brother and according to the own pleadings of the husband, the eldest brother a highly placed person, fit enough to look after the mother for all her comforts.

( 5 ) MR. Utpal Bhattacharya appearing for the husband opposite party contended before us by placing a Division Bench Judgment in Chitra Sengupta v. Dhrubajyoti Sengupta that 1/5th of the husband's net monthly average income would be the safest rule for computation of the alimony pendente lite. Unfortunately the said decision speaks otherwise. Even though under Section 36 of the Divorce Act, 1869 and under Section 39 of the Parsi