A sub-tenant is estopped from disputing the title of the immediate landlord, and this estoppel continues even after the expiry of the head lease.

( 1 ) THE Court : In this Suit the plaintiff has claimed for possession of certain demised premises from the defendant. The facts of the case are not much in dispute and the principal question is one of law.

( 2 ) BY a lease dated 25th June, 1963 the plaintiffs became lessees of the demised premises under one Wachel Molla and Sons. The lease was to expire after a period of 21 years.

( 3 ) THE defendants in the instant suit became sub-tenants under the plaintiffs under another subsequent lease dated 17th July, 1964, for a period commencing from 1st April, 1964 and to expire with expiry of 24th June, 1984. The parties have not disputed before me that in so far as these long leases are concerned, they are outside the purview of the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.

( 4 ) THE instant suit was filed on the 16th April, 1984. The period of the defendants' leasehold had not run out by then. It is also not in dispute that so far as the lease as between the Wachel Molla and Vithalbhai is concerned, the same has run out, as apparent from the face of that lease, with the expiry of 25th June, 1984.

( 5 ) THE point in this suit is whether a sub-tenant like the defendant in this suit can resist the claim for possession made by its immediate landlord against it on the basis of that this landlord has lost title or right to possession under the lease by way of which the (immediate landlord) was originally holding the property.

( 6 ) THE point, to my mind, is well settled by authorities and hardened principles of law. A tenant, in so far as he claims as a tenant, is not permitted to dispute the title of the landlord from whom his tenancy and possession have been derived. This is a rule of estoppel expressly enacted in the Evidence Act itself. On that basis, even a trespasser landlord can maintain a suit for eviction as against his tenant and it would not be open to the tenant to challenge the title of the landlord in any manner whatsoever. The reason for this long standing rule is simple to understand. The tenant comes into possession from and by reason of the landlord. As such, he shall hand over possession to that person from whom he originally came to acquire it and shall not raise pleas or obstacles in that regard.

( 7 ) IT little matters whether the lease of Vithalbhai with Wachel Molla expired on 25th June, 1984 or 24th June, 1984, was one day prior, or subsequent, to the date of expiry of the lease of the defendant, i. e. Union Bank of India. The defendant is not entitled to enquire about the original title of the admitted landlord Vithalbhai Private Limited and a claim for possession cannot be resisted on the ground.

( 8 ) IT may appear at first flush that a person who is apparently not entitled to retain possession with himself is obtaining a decree for possession as against another person. It might be a matter of surprise to the lay mind but to the legal mind, it does not present any contradiction. The law is well aware of relative rights arising as amongst different parties based on relationships amongst the parties themselves. As between the plaintiff and the defendant in this suit, the defendant cannot resist a claim for possession. That does not in the least mean that the right of Vithalbhai to obtain possession as against the Union Bank of India is a right that can be enforced by Vithalbhai in respect of the demised property. The decree as against Union Bank binds only Union Bank and the same could be put into execution against the Union Bank or others claiming through it. On this basis, the question of Vithalbhai's original title clearly appears to be a matter of complete irrelevance.

( 9 ) MR. Kapoor appearing with Mr. Sinha on behalf of the plaintiff relied, in the above regard, upon two cases being the case of Bhaiganta Bewa and Krishna Rao, reported respectively in 24 Calcutta Law Journal page 103 and AIR 1932 Madras page 298. In my opinion, it was rightly contended on the basis o