1992 Supreme(Cal) 66
High Court Of Calcutta
Nirendra Krishna Mitra, Amulya Kumar Nandi
BANAMALI NEOGI - Appellant
Versus
ASOKE KUMAR CHATTOPADHYAY - Respondent
S. A. 880 Of 1976
Decided On : 02/12/1992
MRINAL KANTI ROY
One shebait can maintain an action to challenge an invalid alienation despite inaction on the part of other shebaits.
Headnote:
DEBUTTAR PROPERTY - ALIENATION - LIMITATION - SECTION 7 OF THE INDIAN LIMITATION ACT - APPLICABILITY - ACTION BY ONE SHEBAIT TO CHALLENGE AN INVALID ALIENATION - MAINTAINABILITY - RIGHT OF ACTION SURVIVES DESPITE INACTION ON THE PART OF OTHER SHEBAITS.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff, a shebait of certain deities, filed a suit for a declaration that the disputed property is absolute debuttar property of the deities and that a kobala in favor of defendants 1 to 5 is not binding on the deities. The plaintiff's father had endowed the property to the deities and appointed the plaintiff and defendants 6 and 7 as shebaits. The plaintiff attained majority in 1969 and discovered that defendant 6 and his father had transferred the property in 1966. The defendants contended that the transfer was for valuable consideration and legal necessities.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the plaintiff had locus standi to sue and that the suit was not barred by limitation. It also found that the disputed property was absolute debuttar property belonging to the deities and that it was not sold for legal necessity.
Issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff's action is barred by limitation under section 7 of the Indian Limitation Act. 2. Whether one shebait can maintain an action to challenge an invalid alienation despite inaction on the part of other shebaits.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 7 of the Indian Limitation Act applies to monetary claims as well as immovable property. 2. One of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit can maintain an action despite the inaction of the other persons, if a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person. 3. A shebait is a manager or trustee of an idol and cannot transfer property by virtue of a deed. 4. A transfer by one shebait will not bind the deity. 5. Other shebaits can question the alienation on attainment of majority either jointly or severally. 6. A solemn duty is vested in the shebait to protect the property of the deity, who is a perpetual minor.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed.
( 1 ) THIS appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree awarded by the 2nd Court of the Additional District Judge, Midnapore to Title Appeal No. 30 of 1975.
( 2 ) THE plaintiff filed the suit for a declaration that the disputed 'ka' schedule property is absolute debuttar property of the deities and the kobala mentioned in the plaint schedule in favour of defendant Nos. 1 to 5 is not binding on the deities. The plaintiff sued as a shebait of the deities.
( 3 ) ONE Satya Kinkar, father of the plaintiff by virtue of a registered Deed of Settlement on 30-l-1952 endowed 'kha' schedule property to the deities and appointed three sons figuring as plaintiff and defendant Nos. 6 and 7 as shebaits of the deities. The 'ka' schedule property is a part of 'kha' schedule property. The plaintiff was born on l-4-1951 and he attained majority on 1-4-1969. On attainment of majority he tried to take possession of the 'kha' schedule property. While defendant Nos. 1 to 5 refused to deliver a possession to the plaintiff it was disclosed that defendant No. 6 and his father Satya Kinkar as guardian of the minors viz. plaintiff and defendant No. 6 had transferred the property on 12-7-1966.
( 4 ) DEFENDANT Nos. 1 to 5 in their joint written statement inter alia contended that defendant No. 6 and his father, Satya Kinkar as guardian of the minor plaintiff and defendant No. 7 had transferred the property to them for valuable consideration and for legal necessities.
( 5 ) IT has been concurrently found by the two courts below that the plaintiff as shebait of the deities had locus standi to sue. It has further been held that the suit by the plaintiff is not barred by limitation since he filed the suit within 3 years from the date of attainment of the majority in the year 1969. Both the courts are of the opinion that the disputed property was the absolute debuttar property belonging to the deities. There is a concurrent Ending that the disputed property was not sold for legal necessity.
( 6 ) IN Second Appeal all these concurrent findings of the two courts below are not vulnerable.
( 7 ) THE only legal point that falls for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the action by the plaintif? is barred by limitation. Shebaiti is both an office and a property as held in Profulla v. Satya (1979) 3 SCC 409 ; Sri Sri Kalimata v. Ramchandra 75 CWN 1 ; Ram Rattan v. Bajrang Lal, AIR 1978 SC 1393 Nevertheless, the shebaits are the Managers or the Trustees of an idol. One of the Managers or Trustees cannot transfer a property by virtue of a Deed. This theory was propounded by the privy Council in Lal Manmohan v. Janaki Prosad, 49 CWN 195. Therefore, the plaintiff can very well question the transfer made by one of the shebaits figuring as defendant No. 6 and his father as guardian of the plaintiff and defendant No. 7. In other words, a transfer by defendant No. 6 who was a shebait will not bind the deity. No. 7 was another shebait. He, however, did not question the transfer even on attainment of majority. We have been invited to decide as to whether section 7 of Indian Limitation Act will operate as a bar to an action by the plaintiff since defendant No. 7 did not question the transfer after attainment of majority. Section 7 of the Indian, Limitation Act reads as follows :"disability of one of several persons-where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is under any such disability, and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person, time will run against them all, but, where no such discharge can be given, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the order or until the disability has ceased. Explanation I.-This section applies to a discharge from every kind of liability, including a liability in respect of any immovable property. Explanation II.-For the