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2000 Supreme(Cal) 432

High Court Of Calcutta
VINOD KUMAR GUPTA
UCO BANK - Appellant
Versus
AMALGAMATED COALFIELDS LTD. - Respondent
G. A.  1943  Of  1999
Decided On : 08/21/2000

The limitation period for filing an execution application starts running from the date the decree becomes enforceable, and a second execution application cannot be considered an extension of the first execution application for the purpose of limitation.

Headnote:

EXECUTION OF DECREE - LIMITATION - STARTING POINT - DECREE SATISFIED - NO EXECUTION APPLICATION MAINTAINABLE - DECREE HOLDER CANNOT TAKE MIS-CONCEIVED SUBTERFUGE TO COVER UP LAPSE OF NOT APPEALING AGAINST THE ORDER - UCO BANK V. AMALGAMATED COALFIELDS LTD. - ORDER 21 RULE 11 CPC - ARTICLE 136 LIMITATION ACT.

Fact of the Case:

The Appellant, UCO Bank, filed an execution application in 1998 to execute a decree passed in 1986. The execution application was dismissed by the trial court on the ground of limitation. The Appellant challenged the dismissal order, arguing that the limitation period should start running from the date of a judgment passed in 1997 in a writ petition filed by the Respondent, or that the second execution application was an extension of the first execution application filed in 1998.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the limitation period for filing an execution application starts running from the date the decree becomes enforceable, which in this case was the date the decree was passed in 1986. The court further held that the judgment passed in the writ petition in 1997 was a new cause of action and did not affect the enforceability of the decree passed in 1986. The court also held that the second execution application was not an extension of the first execution application and was therefore time-barred.

Issues: 1. Whether the limitation period for filing an execution application starts running from the date the decree becomes enforceable or from the date of a subsequent judgment affecting the enforceability of the decree. 2. Whether a second execution application can be considered an extension of the first execution application for the purpose of limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The limitation period for filing an execution application starts running from the date the decree becomes enforceable, unless any contrary intention is indicated in the decree itself. 2. A second execution application cannot be considered an extension of the first execution application for the purpose of limitation, unless the first execution application was kept pending or the court specifically granted liberty to file a second execution application.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal with costs.

V. K. GUPTA, J.

( 1 ) THIS Appeal is directed against the order dated 5th May, 1999 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court whereby the execution application filed by the Appellant, UCO Bank was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by limitation. Brief facts leading to the filing of the Appeal are that in the year 1977, preciesly on 3rd January, 1977 the Appellant Bank filed a suit against the Respondent Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. inter alia claiming a decree for a particular amount of money along with interest. The said suit filed by the appellant was finally heard and disposed of by a Judgment and Decree passed on 24-6-1968 by a learned trial Judge of this Court. The following operative portion of the aforesaid Judgment may be re-produced hereunder for ready reference. It reads thus :"it appears that the Bank preferred a claim before the Commissioner of payments in respect of the compensation payable to the Amalgamated Coal Fields Ltd. By the order dated June 12, 1980 the Commissioner of payments admitted the claim of the plaintiff Bank to the tune of Rs. 43,77,862. 00 p. The said sum includes interest from May 1, 1973 to October 31, 1974 amounting to Rs. 2,47,803. 54p. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case and by consent of the parties the suit is disposed of by the following decree and order : there will be a decree for the sum of Rs. 43,77,862/ -. The plaintiff will also be entitled to interest from November 1, 1974 @ 4%per annum till the date of the suit and @ 6% per annum from the date of the suit till the date of the decree on the sum of Rs. 43,77,862/ -. The plaintiff will also be entitled to interest on judgment @ 6% and cost assessed at Rs. 15,000/-"

( 2 ) AS will be noticed the Judgment and Decree above mentioned provided for payment of interest on the principal sum @ 4% per annum from 1st November 1974 till the date of the filing of the Suit and @ 6% per annum from the date of the filling of the Suit till the date of the passing of the decree. It is the admitted case of the parties, particularly that of the appellant that pursuant to the passing of the aforesaid consent decree, the appellant received a total amount of Rs. 74,84,712 in two parts, one for Rs. 43,77,862/- and another of Rs. 31,06,850/ -. It is also the admitted case of the parties, particularly that of the appellant that the aforesaid amount included the principal sum awarded in the decree and the entire interest entitlement calculated thereupon, both for the period from November 1, 1974 till the date of the filing of the Suit at the rate of 4 per cent p. a. and from the date of the filing of the Suit till the date of the passing of the decree at the rate of 6 per cent. These amounts were received by the appellant in 1987 and 1992. Undoubtedly therefore, the decree stood satisfied in all respects since the appellant decree holder had received the entire amount awarded in the Decree which was passed in its favour.

( 3 ) IT appears that some time in 1994 the Respondent filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in this Court wherein it prayed, inter alia for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, commanding the appellant and others to pay an amount of Rs. 9,13,921/- to the Respondent which the appellant purportedly received from the respondent by way of alleged excess payment towards the interest entitlement @ 6% p. a. whereas as per the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 such entitlement could not exceed at any rate more than @ 4 per cent per annum. This writ petition was allowed by a Judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court delivered on 11th July, 1997. The following operative portion of the Judgment will indicate the relief granted by this Court in the aforesaid writ application in favour of the Respondent which admittedly was against the appellant:"for the reasons aforementioned, this application is allowed to the extent aforementioned and the Commissioner of Payment is directed














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