A divorced Muslim woman is entitled to claim maintenance beyond the iddat period, and the husband is liable to make reasonable and fair provision for her future, as established by the apex court's decisions and the provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.

( 1 ) THIS is an application under section 397,401 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 filed by petitioner shehnaz @ Shahjahan against the State of West Bengal and Opposite Party No. 2 Md. Ekram Khan seeking to set aside the order dated 22. 3. 2000 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, 2nd Court, Sealdah, South 24-Parganas in Case No. M-11 of 1996 (T. R. No. 11 of 98) dismissing the petition under section 125 of Cr. PC filed by the petitioner and allowing the petition under section 127 (2) (b) of Cr. PC read with sections 5 and 7 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 filed by the Opposite Party No. 2.

( 2 ) THE facts leading to the present revisional application are as under :-the present petitioner had filed an application before the concerned Court under section 125 Cr. PC against the Opposite party No. 2 alleging neglect to maintain her by the said Opposite party No. 2 as also torture, both physical and mental for which ultimately the petitioner was driven out on 16. 6. 96 from her matrimonial home.

( 3 ) OPPOSITE Party No. 2 had also filed an application under section 127 (2) (b) read with sections 5 and 7 of the Muslim woman (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 for dropping the petition under section 125 of the Cr. PC filed by the petitioner alleging that during the pendency of the said case he had given 'talak' to the petitioner on 22. 9. 97 in presence of witnesses.

( 4 ) AFTER contested hearing, it was held by the learned Magistrate that the factum of 'talak' came to be known to the petitioner on 29. 9. 97 when O. P. No. 2 came up with an application under section 127 (2) (b) of Cr. PC read with sections 5 and 7 of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 and finally the learned Court below came to the conclusion that the petitioner being a divorced wife is not entitled to claim maintenance from the Opposite Party No. 2 with a further finding that the O. P. No. 2 is not bound to pay maintenance to the petitioner for iddat period also as the said Opposite Party No. 2 had been paying ad-interim maintenance to his divorced wife contrary to provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, and as such the petitioner's application under section 125 Cr. PC was dismissed.

( 5 ) THE present revisional application has been directed seeking to set aside the impugned order as the aforesaid order suffers from legal and factual infirmities which go to the very root of the matter resulting the impugned order being not sustainable in law. Moreover, the learned Court below has failed to appreciate the provisions of Chapter XVI as also sub-section 2 of section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 and as such there has been miscarriage of justice for which protection has been sought for by the petitioner by approaching this Court.

( 6 ) I have heard the learned counsels of both sides at length.

( 7 ) IN Shah Bano's case reported in 1985 (2) SCC 556, principal question came up for consideration before the apex Court was the interpretation of section 127 (3) (b) of Cr. PC that where a Muslim woman had been divorced by her husband and paid her mahr, would it indemnify the husband from his obligation under the provisions of section 125 Cr. PC.

( 8 ) IN the aforesaid case, next question came up for consideration before the apex Court that whether the amount of mahor constitutes a reasonable alternative to the maintenance order.

( 9 ) IT was held by the apex Court in the aforesaid decision that although Muslim Personal Law limits the husband's liability to provide maintenance for the divorced wife to the period of 'iddat', it does not contemplate a situation envisaged by section 125 of Cr. PC. It was further held that it would not be incorrect or unjustified to extend the above principle of Muslim Law to cases in which a divorced wife is unable to maintain herself after the period of iddat,