The Tribunal's jurisdiction to interfere with a domestic enquiry is limited and it cannot assume the jurisdiction of an original or appellate court. Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act refers to unqualified recovery of money, which includes back wages but not current wages.

( 1 ) THE petitioner has challenged the order dated 7th of January, 2000 by which the enquiry was held to be invalid. He has also challenged the order dated 27th March, 2001 by which the interim relief was granted.

( 2 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent submitted that he does not want to use any affidavit. The writ petition may be disposed of on the basis of the materials available before the court.

( 3 ) I have gone through the order dated 7th January, 2000 relating to the invalidity of the domestic enquiry. The scope and ambit of such a proceeding is confined to the irregularity in the proceeding itself. The Tribunal is not supposed to enter into the finding of fact arrived at by the Tribunal unless such finding is not justified. In the present case, the Tribunal appears to have entered into the merits of the case as an original fact finding authority. It has come to its own finding of belief and disbelief, which it cannot do. It should nave confined itself within the scope and ambit of the enquiry with regard to the validity of the domestic enquiry and the justification of the action.

( 4 ) THE extent of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to interfere with the domestic enquiry was initially very limited. Domestic enquiry was held to be the prerogative of the management. But gradually the concept started developing. In Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1952) LAC 490, laid down four conditions which made the managerial action vulnerable. These conditions were adopted by the Supreme Court with slight modification in Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1958 (1) LLJ 260 (SC ). It was laid down that the power of the management in respect of its internal administration and discipline is not unlimited; it can be interfered with in course of industrial adjudication in order to justify the action and to grant appropriate relief. But, however, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is not that of an appellate court [bisra Stone Lime Co. Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, 1970 (1) LLJ 626 (S. C.)]. The Tribunal can interfere only in cases of (i) want of good faith; (ii) victimisation or unfair labour practice; (iii) basic error of management or violation of principles of natural justice; and (iv) baseless or perverse findings. The decision in Indian Iron and Steel Co, Ltd. (supra) was elaborated and clarified in the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts.

( 5 ) THIS position changed with the insertion of Section 11a of the Industrial Disputes Act by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act 1971 w. e. f. 15. 12. 1971. It empowered the Tribunal to be satisfied with regard to the justification of the action. In interpreting the same, the Apex Court in Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Management, 1973 (1) LLJ 278 (SC), had held that the Tribunal can re-apprise the evidence in the domestic enquiry in order to satisfy itself that the misconduct alleged against the workman is established. The limitation imposed in Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. (supra) was thus stretched to the arena of reappraisal of evidence. Its application however, confines to a case based on valid enquiry. But in cases of 'invalid enquiry' and 'no-enquiry' the Tribunal is entitled to exercise its original jurisdiction with regard to the merit and justifiability of the action.

( 6 ) BUT that re-appraisal cannot be that of either the original or of an appellate court but of a revisional court. Or in other words it is clothed with the additional power of re-appraisal of evidence with a revisional courts' outlook. The satisfaction is that of a court scrutinising that of an employer to justify the action. On such re-appraisal it has to satisfy itself that on such evidence the action could be justified. There remains a thin distinction in the exercise of such jurisdiction. In the name of re-appraisal it cannot weigh the evidence in the same manner as an original or appellat