A notice for eviction served upon one of the legal heirs of the original tenant is defective and invalid.

( 1 ) THE present appeal has been directed against the judgment of the appellate court dated 21-4-1993 passed, by Sir A. K. Banerjee, learned Additional District Judge, 2nd Court, Suri, birbhum in connection with Title Appeal No. 86 of 1991 whereby he was pleased to dismiss the appeal on contest and confirm the judgment of decree dated 25-4-1991 passed by Sri Surjendu biswas, learned Munsif, Birbhum in connection with Title Suit No. 147 of 1986.

( 2 ) IT is stated in the memo of appeal that the learned Additional District Judge erred in law in not holding that the notice was bad in law as the father of the plaintiff was the original tenant of the suit property and after his death the other sons and daughters also inherited the tenancy, but the plaintiff did not serve the notice of ejectment on all the co-tenants by inheritance. It is also taken in the memo of appeal that the courts below erred in law in not holding that the notice of ejectrnent was not duly served upon the defendant. It is also stated that the courts below erred in holding that the requirement of the suit house by the plaintiff was bona fide and genuine. It is again stated that the courts below were wrong in holding that the defendant had violated the provisions of clauses (m), (o) and (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. The courts below were also wrong, it is added, in not giving any independent finding regarding the question of default and as such there cannot be any decree on the ground of default simply on the basis of the interlocutory findings.

( 3 ) AFTER the appeal was taken up for hearing it appears that no substantial question of law was formulated at the time of admission of the appeal and as such the following substantial questions of law have been formulated. "1. whether the courts below are justified in considering the evidence of the plaintiff beyond the pleadings with regard to the relationship between the parties touching the maintainability of the suit itself. 2. whether the courts below are justified in passing the decree on the grounds of clauses (m), (o) and (p)of Section 108 of the Transfer of property Act without considering the nature of construction; and 3. whether the courts below are justified to pass the decree without considering the mandatory provision of Section 13 (4) of the West bengal Premises Tenancy Act. "

( 4 ) MR. Jyotirmoy Bhattacharya, learned senior Advocate for the appellant/tenant/defendant has taken me through the provisions of clause (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of property Act and argues elaborately as to what is meant by the term "permanent structure". According to him a structure can be taken as a permanent structure if the same cannot be removed without affecting the structural strength of the main buildings and, he goes on arguing, the courts below did not consider this aspect. Mr. Bhattacharya has also argued before me that the requirements always vary from individual to individual and it is pointed out by him that the plaintiff is a hawker. The learned Senior Advocate for the appellant has also taken me through paragraph 3 of the plaint where the plaint case has been described in the terms that originally the suit property belonged to one Smt. Dasi and Dilbar Mia was her tenant in respect of a shop for dealing in hemp. It is also stated there that after the death of Dilbar his son Md. Idris "had continued the said hemp shop in the suit premises" as a monthly tenant under Smt. Dasi, Smt. Dasi transferred the suit holding to Umapada De and Md. Idris became his tenant. Umapada transferred the suit premises in favour of the plaintiff and Md. Idris became his tenant in respect of the suit premises. The learned senior advocate for the appellant has then taken me through the paragraph 11 of the written statement where the defence case has. inter aha, been described in the terms that Dilbar mia was the original tenant in the suit premises and he had been carrying on va