An order appointing a Receiver under the Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 is appealable under Section 20 of the Act because the words 'an order' appearing in Section 20 mean 'any order' made or deemed to have been made by the Tribunal, and not just a final order.

( 1 ) CHALLENGING an order dated 27/11/2001 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta in O. A. No. 51 of 2001, the petitioner in the past moved an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before this Court on 6/12/2001 when this Court refused to entertain the said revisional application on the ground that the said order being an appealable one under Section 20 of the Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 ('act"), the petitioner should approach the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Act. This Court however did not go into merit and permitted the learned advocate for the petitioner to take back the certified copy of the order impugned on furnishing a xerox copy thereof.

( 2 ) PURSUANT to the aforesaid order dated 6/12/2001 the petitioner preferred an appeal before the learned Appellate Tribunal under the Act being Appeal No. DRAT/cal-/a/21 of 2001 but the learned Appellate Tribunal by its order dated January 10, 2002 dismissed the said appeal on the ground that no appeal lay against an interlocutory order appointing Receiver over the property. The learned Appellate Tribunal was of the view that an appeal under Section 20 of the Act was maintainable only against a final order passed by the learned Tribunal on an application under Section 19 of the Act.

( 3 ) AFTER the passing of the aforesaid order, the petitioner has filed an application for review of my earlier order dated 6/12/2001 and has prayed for leave to file a fresh application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against order dated 27/11/2001 as also an earlier order dated 18/10/2001 which had merged with order dated 27/11/2001.

( 4 ) AT the time of hearing of these two applications I issued a suo motu rule calling upon the bank to show cause why the order dated 10/01/2001 passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal dismissing the appeal as not maintainable should not be set aside.

( 5 ) MR. Dhandhania, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the bank waived service of notice on behalf of his client and thus the said suo motu rule was also heard along with these two applications.

( 6 ) BY the application for review the petitioner has prayed that in view of subsequent order passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal under the Act holding that the appeal against order dated 27/11/2001 was not maintainable, this Court should vary or recall the earlier order passed by this Court refusing to entertain the application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and should permit the petitioner to move a fresh application against the selfsame order dated 27/11/2001. In my opinion, the ground taken in the application for review is devoid of any substance. This Court in the past having specifically held that the order impugned in the said application viz. order dated 27/11/2001 was an appealable order under Section 20 of the Act, the learned Appellate Tribunal which is subject to the superintendence of this Court cannot come to a different conclusion holding that no appeal is maintainable against such order. The said order dated 6/12/2001 was passed in the presence of the petitioner as well as the bank and as such was binding not only upon the parties but also upon the learned Appellate Tribunal which is bound to follow the direction given in the said order. Thus, even though the petitioner has not challenged the said order dated January 10, 2002 passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal, when attention of this Court was drawn to such order, this Court was compelled to issue a suo motu rule under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, it appears that neither of the parties challenged my order dated 6/12/2001 before the Supreme Court and on the contrary, the petitioner by complying with my direction preferred an appeal before the learned Appellate Tribunal. Thus, there is no scope of disputing the correctness of my order at the instance the petitioner unless it can establish that