The one-year embargo on departmental proceedings after steps are taken to prosecute an employee applies from the date of commission of the offense, not the date of lodging of the FIR.

( 1 ) THE petitioner has challenged the departmental proceedings on the ground that the chargesheet could not be issued and no departmental proceeding could be initiated and proceeded with, in view of Clause 6. 3 of the manual on disciplinary action and related matters of UCO Bank read with Clause 2. 1 thereof. According to the petitioner, a disciplinary proceeding starts with the issue of the chargesheet, as is laid down in Clause 2. 1 of the Manual. As such, issue of chargesheet is a step for proceeding departmentally. In terms of Clause 6. 3, a departmental proceeding cannot be proceeded against a delinquent, if steps have been taken to prosecute an employee or get him prosecuted for an offence involving moral turpitude, unless he is put on trial within a year of commission of offence. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the expression "commission of offence" means the day when the commission of offence is brought to the notice of the prosecuting authority, namely, the date of lodging of the FIR and as such, unless one year expires from the lodging of the FIR, the departmental proceeding cannot be initiated. He also relies on the decision in capt. M. Paul Anthony v, Bharat Gold Mines limited and Anr. , reported in AIR 1999 SC 1416 : 1999 (3) SCC 679 : 1999-I-LLJ- 1094, in support of his contention.

( 2 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, points out to clause 19. 4 of the Bipartite Settlement on the basis of which Clause 6. 3 of the Manual was so incorporated. Relying on the said provision, the learned counsel for the respondents contends that the one year embargo is related to the date of commission of offence and not the date of lodging of the FIR. He also contends that neither Clause 6. 3 nor Clause 19. 4 of the settlement prescribe issuing of the chargesheet. It is only the proceeding of the departmental enquiry that is prescribed. Therefore, the chargesheet was rightly issued and it could be proceeded with, since one year from the commission of offence has already expired. The decision in Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra)does not apply in the present case. Alternatively, he submits that if the period of one year is calculated from the date of commission of offence, in that event, chargesheet that has been issued on 5/03/2001, is a day long after lapse of one year after commission of offence. As such the same cannot be said to be invalid. He relied on the decision of this Court in Sekhar Chandra Saha v. West Bengal State Warehousing Corporation and Ors. , reported in 1994 LIC NOC 331 (Cal ).

( 3 ) I have heard the respective counsel at length, on the question of extension of Interim order. Clause 19. 4 of the Bipartite Settlement provides as follows:"if after steps have been taken to prosecute an employee or to get him prosecuted, for an offence, he is not put on trial within a year of the commission of the offence, the management may then deal with him as if he had committed an act of 'gross misconduct' or of 'minor misconduct', as defined below; provided that if the authority which was to start prosecution proceedings refuses to do so or come to the conclusion that there is no case for prosecution it shall be open to the management to proceed against the employee under the provisions set out below in Clauses 19. 11 and 19. 12 infra relating to discharge, but he shall be deemed to have been on duty during the period of suspension, if any, and shall be entitled to the full wages and allowances and to all other privileges for such period. In the event of the management deciding, after enquiry, not to continue him in service, he shall be liable only for termination with three months pay and allowances in lieu of notice as provided in Clause 19. 3 (supra ). If within the pendency of the proceedings, thus instituted, he is put on trial such proceedings shall be stayed pending the completion of the trial, after which the provisions mentioned in Clause 19. 3 above shall