The general principles of law, such as "lex Non Cogit Ad Impossibilia" and "actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit", must be applied to prevent miscarriage of justice, unless their application is clearly barred by express declaration or irresistible implication.

( 1 ) AN award made on 28-11-77 was presented for registration to the Sub-Registrar on 25-11-83 and was admitted to registration on the same day. Could that be done after such a long lapse of time ? That is the question that has come up for our consideration in this case arising out of a petition filed under Art. 227.

( 2 ) UNDER S. 23 of the Registration Act, an award, like any other non-testamentary instrument, is to be presented for registration before the Sub-Registrar within 4 months from the date of its execution. If, however, owing to urgent necessity or unavoidable accident, an award or other non-testamentary instrument is not presented for registration within 4 months of its execution, the Registrar, but not the Sub-Registrar, may direct that such document shall be accepted for registration on payment of fine provided the delay in presentation beyond the period of 4 months as aforesaid, does not exceed 4 months more. In other words, while ordinarily the period within which a document is to be presented for registration before the Sub-Registrar is 4 months from the date of its execution, in some extraordinary cases as envisaged in S. 25 the Registrar may allow a further period of 4 months. A total period of 8 months, is, therefore, the limit for presenting a document for registration under the provisions of S. 25 read with S. 23 of the Registration Act. In this case, the award has been admitted to registration by the Sub-Registrar without any direction from the Registrar as to extension of time from 4 months to 8 months under S. 25 and the award having been registered almost 6 years after its execution, was registered palpably beyond time, unless time could be extended, the delay could be condoned or any period could be ex-eluded from consideration.

( 3 ) MR. Banerjee, the learned counsel for the petitioner has very strongly urged that no registration is permissible beyond the period fixed under S. 25 read with S. 23 of the Registration Act and any registration beyond such period is void. Mr. Banerjee has, in support of his contention, relied on a Division Bench decision of the Rangoon High Court in Daw Nyi Ma v. Ma E Tim AIR 1938 Rang 53 and also a Division Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in Ram Singh v. Jasmer Singh AIR 1963 Punj 100. In the Rangoon decision it has been stated (supra, at 55) (of AIR 1938 Rang 53) that a Sub-Registrar has "no jurisdiction" to proceed with registration of a document which was already 4 months old and any such registration would be bad. In the Punjab decision it has been held (supra, at 102) that a document presented for registration after the period of 8 months as provided in S. 25 of the Registration Act "could not, under any circumstances be registered".

( 4 ) IF the matter rested there then we would have, with respect, dissented from the Rangoon and the Punjab view and would have held that there can be circumstances when a Registration Officer would have jurisdiction to admit a document to registration, even though presented after the period fixed under S. 23 or S. 25. But the two Division Bench decisions of this Court, on which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Banerjee, would apparently stand in the way and these decisions are Motahar Ali v. Abdul Malek AIR 1957 Cal 324 and Aditya Kumar v. Narayandas (1971) 75 Cal WN 439.

( 5 ) IN Motahar Ali (supra) it has been held (at 326) by the Division Bench that the period of 30 days fixed by S. 75 (2) of the Registration Act for the presentation of a document for registration cannot be extended and the observations of a learned single-Judge in Mafisur Rahaman v. Jamila Khatun (1938) 42 Cal WN 1174, to the effect that the provisions of the Registration Act regarding the time within which certain acts are to be done are peremptory in character and are not capable of being extended in the absence of express provisions in that behalf, have been referred to with approval. In Aditya Kumar (AIR 1971 Cal 65) (su