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1993 Supreme(Cal) 176

High Court Of Calcutta
A. M. BHATTACHARJEE, N. K. BATABYAL
MUHAMMAD RAISUDDIN - Appellant
Versus
UNION OF INDIA - Respondent
F. M. A. T.  225  Of  1993
Decided On : 04/07/1993

Reasons for declaring an association unlawful under S. 3(1) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and for bringing the Notification into immediate operation under S. 3(3) of the Act may be stated together in the Notification, and substance prevails over form.

Headnote:

{'KEYWORD': 'Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967', 'SUBJECT': 'Notification of an Unlawful Association', 'ACT SECTION LIST': 'S. 3, S. 4', 'SUMMARY': 'The Court upheld the Notification declaring Jammat-e-Islami Hind (JEIH) as an unlawful association and its immediate operation under S. 3(3) of the Act, finding that the reasons for declaring JEIH unlawful were also the reasons for its immediate operation. The Court rejected the argument that reasons for immediate operation must be separately stated, holding that substance prevails over form. The Court also declined to decide whether an order would be invalid if reasons were not communicated to the affected party, as it found that reasons were stated in the Notification.'}

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, professing to be the President of JEIH, challenged the Notification declaring JEIH as an unlawful association and its immediate operation under S. 3(3) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The petitioner did not challenge the legality or propriety of the Notification itself, but argued that the immediate operation of the Notification was illegal as reasons were not separately stated for its immediate operation.

Finding of the Court:

The Court found that the reasons for declaring JEIH unlawful were also the reasons for its immediate operation, and that these reasons were stated in the Notification. The Court rejected the argument that reasons for immediate operation must be separately stated, holding that substance prevails over form.

Issues: Whether the Notification declaring JEIH as an unlawful association and its immediate operation under S. 3(3) of the Act was valid.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that the Notification was valid, as the reasons for declaring JEIH unlawful were also the reasons for its immediate operation, and these reasons were stated in the Notification. The Court also declined to decide whether an order would be invalid if reasons were not communicated to the affected party, as it found that reasons were stated in the Notification.

Final Decision: The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Notification declaring JEIH as an unlawful association and its immediate operation.

A. M. BHATTACHARJEE, C. J, J.


( 1 ) BY a Notification issued under the provisions of S. 3 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 Jammat-e-Islami Hind (hereinafter referred to as JEIH) has been declared to be an Unlawful Association and it has been further directed that the Notification shall have effect from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette being 10/12/1992. The petitioner, professing to be the President of JEIH, has challenged the said Notification by a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution and the learned trial Judge has directed the parties concerned to file affidavits, but has, by a speaking order, declined to issue any interlocutory interdiction. The petitioner having felt aggrieved by the non-issuance of any interlocutory order by the learned trial Judge has moved us in appeal.

( 2 ) MR. Arun Prakash Chatterjee, the learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the petitioner/appellant, has made it clear that since the writ petition is awaiting disposal by the trial Court, he does not, in this appeal before us, challenge the legality, propriety or otherwise of the Notification declaring JEIH to be an Unlawful Association, but has confined. his argument only against the legality of the Notification so far as it directs its immediate operation under S. 3 (3) of the aforesaid Act before the Notification is confirmed under S. 4 of the Act.

( 3 ) THE impugned Notification is reproduced hereinbelow :-"notification new Delhi, the 10/12/1992. S. O. 898 (E) - Whereas Shri Sirajul Hasan, Amir of the Jammat-e-Islami Hind (hereinafter referred to as JEIH) declared in a meeting at Delhi held on the 27/05/1990, that the separation of Kashmir from India was inevitable; and whereas Shri Abdul Aziz, Naib-Amir of JEIH addressing a meeting at Malerkotla on the 1/08/1991, observed that the Government of India should hold plebicite on Kashmir; and whereas JEIH has been dmentioned. The mode of measurement is also mentioned in Clause 1 (a) which will be in pre-work and post-work measurement after deducting 1/9th of the volume for sinkage and shrinkage. As against that, in Clause 1 (b) there is no mention that the silver san P to be supplied by the contractor or that the price included the cost of supply of silver sand. Even the mode of measurement is not mentioned in the said clause. If we take the next clause that is clause (2) there is also mention of earth work and therein it is clearly mentioned that the carried earth is to be supplied by the contractor including the cost of carried earth. In Clause 5 (a) and (b) also, supplying and transporting of brickbats and zama material is clearly mentioned and the mode of measurement is also clearly mentioned. These things, namely that the contractor is to supply the silver sand or to bear the cost of supply of silver sand is not at all mentioned in Clause 1 (b ). The mode of measurement of silver sand is also not mentioned therein.

( 4 ) IT is to be noted that the plaintiff from the very beginning stated and/or insisted that the cost of supply of silver sand is not included in Clause 1 (b) and the cost of supply of the same has to be in accordance with the Presidency Schedule. It is also stated that the mode of measurement is also in accordance with the Presidency Schedule as there is no item in the contract. The definition of the works as given in the Agreement is as hereunder. "the word 'works' shall mean all the works and materials contracted for as set out and described in the said Schedule hereto and in the particulars and specification and the drawings thereof any of them or implied in or by the same or any of them and forming part of this Agreement. "

( 5 ) CLAUSE 1 (b) speaks of rate for labour only and it does not in any way say that the said rate is inclusive of the cost of supply of silver sand.

( 6 ) THE defendant all throughout insisted that the cost of supply of silver sand is not payable by the defendant. This is something which is not borne out by the







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