The cause of action for a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arises on the expiry of fifteen days from the date of knowledge of the complainant about the receipt of notices by the accused persons, sent under clause (b) of Section 138 of the Act.

( 1 ) - The only point emerging for consideration in the instant Revisional Application filed by the accused-petitioners for quashing the relevant proceedings, being Case No. C-118 of 1991 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate of 24-Parganas at Alipore, is whether it was competent for him to take cognizance of the alleged offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter shortened into Act) on the petition of complaint filed by the complainant-opposite party No. 1 beyond the period specified in section 142 (6) thereof, in the facts and circumstances hereinbelow indicated. To put it somewhat differently when had the cause of action for the relevant complaint had arisen, in the facts and circumstances thereof?

( 2 ) ON account of goods supplied by the O. P. No. 1-complainant to the petitioners-accused persons on or before 16. 10. 90, they had handed over a cheque for the sum of Rs. 50,000/- only, being Cheque No. 374629 dated 12. 9. 90, drawn on State Bank of India, Chowringhee Branch, Calcutta, to him (O. P. No. 1) on 12. 9. 90 in discharge of their liability in port. The same was presented (by him) before the Bank on the same very day, to be dishonoured. The complainant had again presented the said cheque before the Bank on 20. 11. 90 on the request of the accused persons, which had again been dishonoured, intimated by the Bank to him on 15. 12. 90 ; whereupon his Advocate had sent registered notices/letters with A/d to the petitioners-accused Nos. 2 and 3 on 28. 12. 90 at their residential addresses for making payment of the said amount within fifteen days of the receipt of the same. Since the A/d cards (acknowledgement thereof) had not reached him till 24. 2. 91, his learned Advocate had sent a letter to the Postal Authority on 25. 2. 91 enquiring about the delivery/service of the aforesaid notices sent by registered post to the petitioners-accused Nos. 2 and 3. On the following day, on 26. 2. 91, he (complainant), however, had received the said A/d cards and came to know that the notices had been received by the accused persons on 1. 1. 91 and 3. 1. 91. The relevant petition of complaint had been filed by the complainant on the very next day, 27. 2. 91. The learned Magistrate upon examination of the witnesses and perusal of the record appears to have taken cognizance o the alleged offence and directed issue of summons upon the petitioners-accused by his order dated 4. 3. 91.

( 3 ) A petition had thereafter been filed on behalf of the accused persons before the learned Magistrate on 14. 11. 91 for dropping the proceedings and discharging them for the reasons stated therein under section 258, Or. P. C. on the plea that the petition of complaint had been filed beyond the Prescribed period, rejected by him (learned Magistrate) by his impugned order dated 6. 12. 91 for the reasons recorded therein.

( 4 ) BEING aggrieved by the order so passed by the learned Magistrate, the accused-petitioners have exercised this Court in Revision for appropriate relief.

( 5 ) AS already indicated, on the relevant cheque being dishonoured twice, the complainant had sent notices by Registered Post with A/d to the accused Nos, 2 and 3 through his Advocate by letters dated 28. 12. 90 demanding payment of the said amount of money. The accused No. 1 had received the aforesaid notice on 1. 1. 91 and the accused No. 3 had received the notice sent to him on 3. 1. 91. In terms of clause (e) of section 138 of the Act the cause of action (for the complaint) should be deemed to have arisen on 18. 1. 91. The complaint was to be filed within one month from 18. 1. 91 under section 142 (6) of the Act, i. e. by 18. 2. 91. But the relevant complaint had been filed by the complainant before the Court on 27. 2. 91, a little beyond one month from the date on which cause of action for the relevant complaint apparently arose. The relevant complaint was prima facie time barred as such. But the question which cro