The High Court having a dominantly larger connection with the cause of action should entertain the writ petition.

( 1 ) THIS is a writ application made by the petitioners who carry on business in Calcutta.

( 2 ) THEY complain against a provisional assessment of duty made in respect of a vessel, M. V. Rainbow Reefer, which was imported into Indian Waters for the purpose of demolition.

( 3 ) THE Bill of Entry shows that the petitioner declared the weight of the ship (called light displacement tonnage, L. D. T.) at 6178. 00 M. Ts. The duty calculated at 5% ad valorem was shown in the Bill of Entry by the petitioners as Rs. 17,19,085/ -.

( 4 ) THE Customs Authorities altered the tonnage to 6441. 00 M. T. Mr. R. C. Nag, appearing for the petitioners said that this alteration was done without any basis whatsoever. He showed the reverse of the Bill of Entry where the respondents' endorsements showed that the L. D. T. given by the petitioners was both as shown on the survey report of 1-10-1993 and as shown in the stability book.

( 5 ) MR. Nag next contended that the Bill of Entry was also wrongfully altered by the respondents by imposing an additional duty of Rs. 1,000 per M. T. on the increased L. D. T.

( 6 ) MR. Nag relied upon the judgment of Ruma Pal, J. reported at. He said that in that case it was held by the Learned Judge that an exemption of Excise Duty was made in 1986 in relation to ships which were intended to be broken up without the use of power. It was also held in that case that the third section of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 makes Customs Duty equal to the Excise Duty so that when the Excise Duty was made nil the Customs Duty also automatically became nil.

( 7 ) THE said third section is the imposing section of additional duty. Mr. Nag submitted the said duty is unimposable as it has already become nil.

( 8 ) MR. Nag said that it was assumed by all parties in that case that power meant electrical power, and not power derived from any other form of physical energy. For the purpose of this case, I need not enter into that question, and Mr. Nag gave the above answer only because I happened to ask the question.

( 9 ) MR. Nag also relied upon the decision of P. B. Mukherji, J. reported in 1978 (2) E. L. T. (J 552) in the case Mercantile Express Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Customs and Ors. Mr. Nag submitted from the observation at paragraph 8 of the said judgment that assessment of duty must be made on the same basis for all citizens concerned by the departments of Customs as otherwise it would lead to discrimination and violation of Article 14.

( 10 ) SO far as invoking the jurisdiction of this Court is concerned, Mr. Nag relied upon the service of the order of provisional assessment upon his clients within the local writ jurisdiction limits of this Court. Indeed it is undeniable that the said order was served at Calcutta and therefore within the local limits of the jurisdiction of this Court so far as entertaining writs under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is concerned.

( 11 ) THAT such an order, when served within such limits, gives the High Court jurisdiction to entertain a writ is also, in my opinion, settled law. Mr. Nag referred to two Division Bench Judgments of this Court which amply bear out the above proposition. The first is the case reported at 90 C. W. N. 438 (the case of Everest Coal Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Coal Controller and Ors.) and the second one is reported at (the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Limited and Ors. ). These are judgments binding upon me and I have no doubt that this Court has every jurisdiction to entertain this writ if it so will in its discretion.

( 12 ) THIS brings me to the crux of the problem. The problem is this. It now happens quite often in India that a petitioner, who wishes to apply tinder Article 226 of the Constitution of India, finds that more than one High Court has connection with the cause of action in question. Take the present case as an example. The vessel came into the Bombay Port. The dismantling work wit