An employer's breach of Section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 does not disentitle the employer from maintaining a writ petition challenging the same award that was allegedly breached.

( 1 ) THE Objection: a preliminary objection as to the eligibility of the writ petitioner to maintain the writ petition has been taken in the affidavit-in-opposition. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that this was not considered by the learned single Judge. It seems that the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant has some substance. After having gone through the order appealed against, we do not find that the learned single judge has considered the said preliminary objection taken by the learned counsel for the appellant. Breach of Section 29 ID Act: Whether disentitles employer to maintain writ petition:

( 2 ) IN the circumstances, we permitted the learned counsel for the appellant to elaborate his submission on the preliminary objection, which he did. The preliminary objection is that by reason of Section 17-A of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947 (1947 Act) the award becomes final and enforceable. By reason of section 29, in case of breach of any term of settlement or award binding on him under the 1947 Act, make such person punishable with imprisonment or fine, as the case may be, as well as for continuous breach. In this case, the award became final and enforceable on february 3, 1990 on account of being published on January 3, 1990; whereas this writ petition was filed in August 1990; as such the writ petitioners were liable to be punished under section 29 of the 1947 Act. Therefore, having been guilty of an offence is not entitled to seek any relief in equitable jurisdiction.

( 3 ) THE seeking of equitable relief is dependent on the principle that one must come with clean hands. If a person, suffering an award binding upon him, seeks relief under article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the very same award, non-compliance thereof would not amount to an offence disentitling such person from seeking relief. This would not amount to come with unclean hands. It is the same award, which is. being challenged. If such a situation is accepted, in that case, no relief would be available to any employer seeking to challenge an award under Article 226 after expiry of one month of publication of the award. In any, event, such non-implementation of the award entitles the petitioner to seek relief under section 17-B in the form of interim relief. At the same time, the Court is not powerless to stay or pass appropriate orders to secure the. interest of the employee, as the case may be. In the circumstances, we do not find there is any substance in the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant on the question of maintainability of the writ; petition, as stated above.

( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant had relied on a decision in Management of Teok tea Estate v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, dibrugarh 2000-I-LLJ-814 (Gau-DB) where it was held that under Section 17-A on the expiry of the period mentioned therein from the publication of the award, the award becomes enforceable. This principle is a settled principle of law.

( 5 ) RELYING on the decision in Northern coalfields Limited v. Industrial tribunal/labour Court and others 1996 (72)flr 728 by a learned single Judge, he pointed out that on the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award under Section 17-A, the learned Court becomes functus officio and the award becomes enforceable. This is also equally settled proposition of law.

( 6 ) THESE two decisions do not help him on the question of preliminary objection with which we are now dealing with. Since the award became enforceable from the period mentioned in Section 17-A, the liability imposed under Section 29 of the 1947 Act would not affect the eligibility of or entitlement to the right to challenge the award and seek relief under the writ jurisdiction.

( 7 ) INASMUCH as a constitutional right to justice cannot be taken away on such a ground. The jurisdiction exercised by the High Court is discretionary. It may decl