High Court Of Calcutta
Before: Sanjib Banerjee, J.
APEEJAY OXFORD BOOKSTORES PRIVATE LIMITED - Appellant
Versus
HOTEL LEELA VENTURE LIMITED - Respondent
A. P. 164 Of 2006
Decided On : 05/10/2007
ARBITRATION - JURISDICTION - CHIEF JUSTICE - VALIDITY OF REQUEST FOR REFERENCE - ARBITRABILITY OF DISPUTES - JURISDICTION OF COURT TO RECEIVE PETITION - FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE - EXCLUSIVITY - SUBSTANCE OF DISPUTE - "SUIT FOR LAND" - SECTION 2(1)(E) OF THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 - LETTERS PATENT, CLAUSE 12.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, a bookstore operator, entered into an agreement with the respondent, a hotel, to run the bookstore at the respondent's hotel in Bangalore. The agreement contained an arbitration clause and provided that the jurisdiction of the agreement would be at Bangalore. A dispute arose between the parties, and the respondent invoked the arbitration agreement and indicated its nominee as arbitrator. The petitioner did not agree to the name suggested by the respondent and instituted proceedings seeking leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent and requesting for the appointment of an arbitrator. The respondent applied for revocation of the leave granted under clause 12 of the Letters Patent and contended that this Court could not have received the petition.
Finding of the Court:
1. The power exercised by the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice of India under section 11(6) of the Act is a judicial power. 2. The Chief Justice or his designate will have the right to decide the preliminary aspects as indicated in the earlier part of this Judgment. These will be, his own jurisdiction, to entertain the request, the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, the existence or otherwise of a live claim, the existence of the condition for the exercise of his power and on the qualifications of the arbitrator or arbitrators. 3. A decision on a matter entrusted by sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) to the Chief Justice or the person or institution designated by him is final. 4. Section 42 of the Act does not apply to applications made under section 11. 5. The validity of a request for reference under section 11(6) [or section 11(4) or section 11(5)] is to be tested on the conditions found in section 2(1)(e) of the Act. 6. The composition of the designated institution or the wherewithal of the designated person, is of no significance in discharging the judicial function under section 11(6) [and section 11(4) and section 11(5)]. 7. A forum selection clause, to be effective, must confer exclusive jurisdiction on a particular Court in clear and unambiguous terms. 8. In the absence of clear and unambiguous terms conferring exclusive jurisdiction, the Court will have to examine the substance of the dispute to determine whether it is a "suit for land" within the meaning of section 2(1)(e) of the Act.
Issues: 1. Whether the Chief Justice of the High Court has jurisdiction to receive a request for reference under section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 2. Whether the validity of a request for reference under section 11(6) is to be tested on the conditions found in section 2(1)(e) of the Act. 3. Whether section 42 of the Act applies to applications made under section 11. 4. Whether a forum selection clause, to be effective, must confer exclusive jurisdiction on a particular Court in clear and unambiguous terms. 5. Whether, in the absence of clear and unambiguous terms conferring exclusive jurisdiction, the Court will have to examine the substance of the dispute to determine whether it is a "suit for land" within the meaning of section 2(1)(e) of the Act.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The power exercised by the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice of India under section 11(6) of the Act is a judicial power. 2. The validity of a request for reference under section 11(6) [or section 11(4) or section 11(5)] is to be tested on the conditions found in section 2(1)(e) of the Act. 3. Section 42 of the Act does not apply to applications made under section 11. 4. A forum selection clause, to be effective, must confer exclusive jurisdiction on a particular Court in clear and unambiguous terms. 5. In the absence of clear and unambiguous terms conferring exclusive jurisdiction, the Court will have to examine the substance of the dispute to determine whether it is a "suit for land" within the meaning of section 2(1)(e) of the Act.
Final Decision: The petition is dismissed and the application for revocation of leave granted under clause 12 of the Letters Patent is allowed. The respondent is entitled to recover actual costs of these proceedings if a reference is ultimately made.
( 1 ) THE question raised, as to the jurisdiction of this Court to receive the petition under section 11 (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is a fallout of the present view that a request to a Chief Justice for a reference to arbitration involves the discharge of functions of judicial nature.
( 2 ) THE parties entered into an agreement on January 31, 2003 for the petitioner to run a bookstore at the respondent's hotel in Bangalore and for the parties to share profits from the bookstore business in addition to the respondent being entitled to a fixed monthly sum. It appears from the correspondence leading up to the respondent's final letter that the respondent was not satisfied with the accounts of the bookstore that it received from the petitioner, the insinuation being that the receipts were underplayed and the expenses overstated so that the payout to the respondent on account of its share of profits would be less. The respondent took the extreme step of demanding that the association be ended and in its letter of January 19, 2006, it required the petitioner to handover vacant possession of the shop in the following words:
"we refer to the Agreement dated 31 January, 2003 entered into between us in respect of B4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 at the Leela Galleria, bangalore ('the Agreement' ). The lock-in period provided in clause 15 of the Agreement is expiring on 31st January, 2006, after which either party is entitled to terminate the Agreement by giving 45 days notice. Accordingly, we hereby give notice of 45 days commencing on 31 january, 2006 terminating the Agreement. The notice period expires on 17 March, 2006. Kindly arrange to handover vacant possession of the premises to us on 17 March, 2006 in terms of the Agreement. "
( 3 ) THE petitioner's response of March 10, 2006 is summarised in the penultimate paragraph thereof:
"we are bonafide occupants of the aforesaid shops. At present we are paying compensation of Rs. 1 Lakh per month and are also liable to pay 50% of profit before interest, depreciation and tax arising out of business operation carried out from the aforesaid shops in terms of the said Agreement. We have not defaulted
in payment of any amounts payable by us under the Aggreement and we have admittedly observed and performed all covenants and stipulations contained in the Agreement and are thus entitled to peaceful use of the aforesaid shops in terms inter alia of clauses 11 and 21 of the agreement. Our occupation is protected in terms of the said agreement and also otherwise and you should not interfere with our peaceful use and occupation of the said shops. The Agreement is initially for a period of 9 years from 1st February, 2003 in terms of clause 1 and your attempts to terminate the same before expiry of the aforesaid period of 9 years are illegal and uncalled for. "
( 4 ) THE respondent invoked the arbitration agreement found in clause 26 of the agreement and indicated its nominee as arbitrator. The petitioner did not agree to the name suggested by the respondent and instituted these proceedings seeking leave under clause 12 of the letters Patent and requesting for the appointment of an arbitrator.
( 5 ) THE respondent applied for revocation of the leave granted under clause 12 of the Letters Patent and contends that this Court could not have received the petition. Prior to making such application, the respondent had applied under section 11 (6) of the Act to the Chief justice of the High Court of Karnataka but that petition was dismissed as an earlier request had already been made and section 11 (11) of the act provides that it is only the earrlier request that may be pursued. It appears from the order passed by the High Court of Karnataka on october 18, 2006 that the respondent urged the points that it now puts forward, but its request was not entertained on the ground that section 11 (11) of the Act barred a subsequent request being considered when an earlier had been made
R.M.A.R.A. Adaikappa Chettiar and Anr. v. R. Chandrasekhar., Thevar
Rodemadan India Ltd. u. International Trade Expo Centre Ltd.
Andhra Pradesh State Trading Corporation v. Auro Logistic Limited and Anr.
Rite Approach Group Ltd. v. Rosoboronexport
Fair Air Engineers (P) Ltd. and Anr. u. N.K. Modi
Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. and Anr. u. Rani Construction Pvt. Ltd.
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.