A citizen who is not a party to the previous litigation cannot be deprived of the benefit of the doctrine of precedent in resisting the action of the State on the ground that it could not invoke the ultra vires provision of the Statute against him.

( 1 ) THIS application under Article 226/227 of the constitution of India is at the instance of an unsuccessful applicant before the west Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal and is directed against order dated 19th May, 2006 passed by the Tribunal thereby dismissing the application filed by the writ petitioner challenging the order of vesting under section 14t (3) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act in a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which had been transferred to the Tribunal after constitution of the same under the provisions of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act.

( 2 ) BEING dissatisfied, the writ petitioner has come up with the present writ application under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.

( 3 ) DR. Mondal, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner has raised a pure question of law in support of this application.

( 4 ) ACCORDING to Dr. Mondal, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of paschim Banga Rajya Bhumijibi Sangha vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 1996 (2) CLJ 285 having specifically declared the provision contained in section 14v vis-a-vis the definition of land as contained in section 2 (7) and section 3a (3) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act as ultra vires Article 300a of the Constitution as the amount payable for acquisition of land was without and just principle and also illusory, the State cannot continue with the process of vesting in terms of section 14t of the said Act. Dr. Mondal further relies upon a subsequent decision of this Court in the case of harisadhan Bandopadhaya and Ors. vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. , reported in 1998 (1) CHN 61 whereby relying upon the aforesaid decision in the case paschim Banga Rajya Bhumijibi Sangha (supra), another Division Bench set aside the order of vesting.

( 5 ) BY relying upon the said two decisions, Dr. Mondal contended that the order of vesting should be set aside.

( 6 ) MR. Banerjee, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the State of west Bengal has, however, opposed the aforesaid contention advanced by Dr. Mondal and has contended that against those two decisions, the State of West bengal has filed applications for special leave to appeal and in those proceedings, the Supreme Court has passed an interim order staying the operation of the orders passed therein. According to Mr. Banerjee, in view of such interim order, those two decisions are not binding upon the State.

( 7 ) THEREFORE, the only question that arises for determination in this application is simply because in an application for grant of special leave, the supreme Court has stayed the operation of an order passed by the Division bench of this Court declaring a statutory provision as ultra vires the Constitution of India as an interim measure imposing further conditions in those cases, whether a citizen who is not a party to the previous litigation can be deprived of the benefit of the doctrine of precedent in resisting the action of the State on the ground that it could not invoke the ultra vires provision of the Statute against him.

( 8 ) BEFORE entering into such question, we propose to take notice of the actual orders of stay passed by the Apex Court.

( 9 ) IT appears from the order dated March 20, 1998 that the order of the division Bench of the High Court was stayed subject to the order of status quo regarding possession on spot should be maintained by both the parties, it further appears from a subsequent order dated December 16, 1999 that another Bench in a different matter being special leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 1416 of 1997 passed an interim order directing that status quo regarding possession on the spot should be maintained by both sides in connection with the members of the petitioner-Sangha who were before the High Court in the writ petition out of which the said proceeding arose. By further order dated April 17, 2004 on various applications