An intimation under section 143 (1) (a) is not an order to attract section 263.

( 1 ) THIS appeal has been preferred against an order dated 28th July, 2003 passed in Writ Petition No. 446 of 2002 by the learned single Judge. In the writ petition, the initiation of the proceeding under section 263 of the Income Tax Act. 1961 in respect of an order contemplated under section 143 (1) was challenged on the ground that in respect of such an order, section 263 has no manner of application. " (1) The learned single Judge rejected the plea on the ground that if an improper assessment order has been made under section 143 (2), the revenue is lost and the State cannot prefer an appeal against such a decision. If despite mistake having been committed in exercising power under section 143 (2), the Assessing Officer does not exercise its power under section 154, no action in appeal can be taken against it. In order to save revenue from such an eventuality, the legislature has embodied section 263 in the Act, Such a case is definitely prejudicial to the revenue sufficient for invoking section 263 even in respect of an order passed under section 143 (1 ). "

( 2 ) BEFORE we proceed to deal with the matter and examine the law, we may remind ourselves that the provision of a fiscal statute has to be construed strictly. The Court can neither add or subtract nor presume, nor can introduce its own view. The provisions of fiscal statutes are to be interpreted strictly according to the letters. Court is powerless to mould the law to suit a particular situation, which the court thinks just even though such a meaning cannot be obtained out of the language employed and the scheme and the context in which those are used. Court is not supposed to twist the law to make it just and serve justice. If the legislature enacts a law, it has to be interpreted as its stands, and if two meanings are possible, then the one beneficial to the assessee is to be adopted. The expressions used in a statute take the colour from the context in which they are employed. The court cannot infuse any meaning to stretch its application in a case, which it thinks just to do so. It is only when the language is clear and the expressions are capable of being extended, the Court then can apply the same in a given case and not otherwise. The position :

( 3 ) IN the present case for the assessment year 1999-2000, an acknowledgement was issued under section 143 (1) (a) (i) by the Income tax Department in respect of the return submitted by the assessee. Subsequently, the proceeding was sought to be revised by the commissioner of Income Tax under section 263 on the ground that the order passed by the Assessing Officer was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. Appellant's contention :

( 4 ) THIS was challenged in the writ petition on the ground urged by dr. Pal, namely :" (1) An intimation issued under section 143 (1) (a) could at best be treated as a notice of demand. It is not an assessment order. Neither it partakes the character of an order passed by the Assessing Officer in any proceeding. It is only a ministerial act. But. in this case, it was simply an acknowledgement slip, which was issued by the Department and not by the Assessing Officer. In terms of the explanation to section 143, an intimation sent under sub-section (1) is deemed to be an order by fiction created thereunder for the purpose of sections 246 and 264 only. (2) Such intimation or acknowledgement can be amended in exercise of section 154 (1) (b) by the authorities under section 116 with a view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record. Therefore, even in section 154, the intimation or acknowledgement has not been treated as an order. (3) Sending of an intimation or acknowledging receipt of the return is a ministerial act and not an order passed by the Assessing Officer. In support, Dr. Pal relied on the decisions in Pradeep Kumar Har Saran lal v. Assessing Officer, (1998) 229 ITR 46 (All.) at pp. 52-54; C/t v. Punjab National Bank, (2001) 249 ITR 763