The Court:

An objection on the ground of territorial jurisdiction pertaining to a request under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is more of an avoidable irritant, since in such proceedings, unlike in a full-fledged action, the only thing that a Chief Justice or his designate is required to do is to make a decision on whether there are live claims to go to arbitration and, if so, set up the arbitral tribunal. Yet, judicial propriety demands that the Chief Justice or his designate receiving a request under Section 11 of the Act keep within the bounds of authority.

The two points canvassed by the respondent here, though of similar ultimate effect, question the authority of the Chief Justice of this Court or his designate, in varying degrees, to take up this matter. The respondent says that since the disputes between the parties relate to a land which is situated in Delhi, no Court in this State could have received an application pertaining to the proposed reference and, as a consequence, the Chief Justice of this Court or his designate would not have the authority to receive a request under Section 11 of the Act in respect of such proposed reference. The other challenge is on the ground of Section 42 of the 1996 Act. The respondent says that since there was, admittedly, a petition filed under Section 9 of the 1996 Act pertaining to this arbitration agreement before the Delhi High Court, all subsequent applications in respect of the agreement have per force to be carried to the Delhi High Court. Though, in the ultimate analysis, the petitioner failing on either count of challenge will have the identical effect, the two objections are qualitatively different. In the second case, there is a fundamental challenge thrown to the authority of the Chief Justice of this Court or his designate to receive the request. In the other case, the challenge has more to do with whether the authority under Section 11 of the 1996 Act can, on facts, be exercised by the Chief Justice of this Court or his designate.

It is, thus, that the second challenge urged by the respondent has to be taken up first since, if it is found that the Chief Justice of this Court or his designate did not have the authority to receive the request, the matter would end there without any assessment being required as to whether the nature of the disputes would make the reference a suit for land. In support of the respondent’s contention on such ground, a Division Bench judgment reported at 2008 (3) Cal LT 1 (Visva Bharati vs Sarkar & Sarkar) is placed. A recent Single Bench judgment reported at AIR 2011 Cal 82 (Ranjita Apartment Owners’ Association vs Prabir Kumar Chakraborty) is also cited. The respondent suggests that in view of the Division Bench judgment and the more recent opinion of a single Judge of this Court, the position as recognised in a previous Single Bench judgment reported at 2007 (3) Cal LT 43 (Apeejay Oxford Bookstores Private Limited vs Hotel Leela Venture Limited) is no longer good law.

Before any discussion can be attempted on the legal proposition as to whether Section 42 of the 1996 Act would have any bearing on a request under Section 11 of that Act to a Chief Justice or his designate, some fundamental rules as to judicial propriety need to be established. The discussion must be prefaced with a note that certainty and consistency are at the root of a mature judicial system. A legal pronouncement of a superior forum, in our hierarchical structure, when cited before an inferior forum is binding on the inferior forum, subject to the condition that the authority of the superior forum is not per inquirium. The expression “per inquirium,” in the context of a judicial opinion, literally implies that a judgment has been rendered in ignorance of law. A judgment can be said to have been rendered in ignorance of the law and, therefore, having no binding value, if such judgment is contrary to any statute or it is contrary to the