Jyotirmay Bhattacharya, J.

The petitioners were the members of the Managing Committee of Delanipur Mosque and Madarasa Committee which was superseded by the Wakf Board. The petitioners have filed this writ petition challenging the order of supersession of the said committee passed by the Wakf Board. They have also challenged the legality of constitution of the present Wakf Board which passed the impugned order of supersession of the said committee. The said order of supersession was notified in the newspaper on 2nd June, 2010 by the Lt. Governor, A & N Islands.

The petitioners complained that reasonable opportunity of hearing was not given to them before superseding the Managing Committee of the said Wakf though Section 67 (2) of the said Act, contemplates that such committee cannot be superseded without giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to them. Be that as it may, this Court will have to consider as to how far the petitioners can challenge the propriety of the said order in the writ jurisdiction of this Court, in view of Section 67(4) of the said Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 67 of the said Act provides that any order made by the Board under Subsection (2) of the said Act shall be final provided that any person aggrieved by the order made under sub-section (2) may, within sixty days from the date of the order, appeal to the Tribunal. The said provision thus makes it clear that the order of supersession passed by the Board under Section 67(2) of the said Act is final subject to the decision of the Tribunal in appeal. Since the statute itself provides for a statutory appeal against such an order of supersession of the committee by the Board, an aggrieved party, in my view, ordinarily cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for challenging the order of supersession without availing of this relief by way of appeal under the statute. However, there is an exception to this ordinary rule, as rightly pointed out by Mrs. Nag, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners who submitted that when an order of supersession of the committee is passed by the Board without affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to the members of the committee, availability of alternative remedy by way of appeal will not stand as a bar in maintaining the writ petition in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others reported in (1998) 8 Supreme Court Cases 1. It is rightly pointed out by Mrs. Nag that alternative remedy would not operate as a bar in almost three contingencies i.e. (1) where the writ petitioners seek enforcement of any of the fundamental rights,

(2) where there is violation of principle of natural justice,

(3) where the order or the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an act is challenged.

Thus if the petitioners succeed in establishing that this order of supersession was passed without giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioners, then of course, they can maintain the writ petition despite a statutory appeal is provided under the Act. Let me now consider as to whether a reasonable opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioners before passing the impugned order of supersession. A show cause notice was issued by the Chief Executive Officer of A & N Islands Wakf Board on 31st March, 2010 whereby the members of the superseded committee were called upon to submit their reply to the said show cause notice within 30 days from the date of receipt of the said notice. Number of irregularities allegedly committed by the said committee were mentioned in the said show cause notice and reply was sought for with regard to those irregularities from the members of the said committee. In response to the said show cause notice, the members of the said Delanipur Mosque and Madarasa committee submitted their reply on 29th April, 2010. In the said reply, the petitio