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2008 Supreme(Cal) 531

High Court of Judicature at Calcutta
L. NARASIMHA REDDY
Subodh Chandra Mondal
Versus
Prakash Chandra Mondal
Decided On : 13-05-2008

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appearing Parties:Abdur Rahaman, S.P.Tewary, Arobinda Ghosh, Indra Nath Mukherjee, Obaidullah Dewan, Mono Chandra Das, Advocates.

Judgment :-

(1). THIS appeal has been preferred by the defendant/appellant being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by learned Civil judge, (Senior Division), Uleberia in Title Appeal No. 14 of 2001 affirming the judgment and decree passed by learned Civil Judge, (Junior Division), uluberia in T. S. No. 375 of 1987.

(2). THE case of the plaintiff/respondent, in short, is that ka schedule property originally belonged to Sk. Md. Ali Khan and others. Satish Chandra acharya took settlement of the said property from Md. Ali Khan and started residing thereon by constructing dwelling house. Sufal Chandra jana purchased two decimals of property i. e. kha Schedule property from satish Chandra Acharya and thereafter Sufal Chandra transferred the same to one Parulbala Ghosh. Since purchase Parulbala started residing on the said property and transferred the kha schedule property including the dwelling house to one Motleb Mollah at a consideration of Rs. 2,000/ on 16th Baisakh 1373 B. S. Abdul Motleb Mollah while in possession of the kha schedule property along with the dwelling house, sold the same to the plaintiff by a registered deed for a consideration of Rs. 2,500/- on 13. 02. 1970. The kha schedule property is the self acquired property of the plaintiff and the same has been purchased by the plaintiff out of his own income. The plaintiff was all along a service holder. The plaintiff after demolishing the dwelling house standing on the kha schedule property, constructed a new building having five rooms at the ground floor and three rooms at the first floor and started residing there with family.

(3). THE plaintiff is the youngest son of his father. The eldest son started business in Calcutta 35 years ago and used to live there. The second son was married about 26 years ago and started residing in separate mess in village Chengile in a rented house. The plaintiff has no relation with the defendant, for the last 26 years. On being requested by the defendant, the plaintiff allowed him to stay in ga schedule property on 25th Agrahayan 1380 B. S. for four years only with the condition that within that period the defendant will seek suitable accommodation elsewhere and vacate the ga schedule property. The plaintiff did not demand any charges for such stay of the defendant in the ga schedule property. As such, the defendant was a mere licensee in ga schedule property and has no other right to stay or live there. After the expiry of four years, the plaintiff asked the defendant to vacate the ga schedule property, but to no effect. Upon revocation of such licence, the defendant has become a trespasser and the plaintiff instituted the suit before the learned Trial court for recovery of possession and other reliefs in ga schedule property.

(4). THE defendant/appellant contested the suit by filing written statement contending, inter alia, that the property was purchased from the joint fund of three brothers and the same was not the self-acquired property of the plaintiff. The three brothers constructed two storied pucca building over the suit property and started residing there as joint owners.

(5). THE learned Trial Court upon consideration of the evidence on record decreed the suit. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the defendant preferred appeal and the learned first Appellate Court dismissed the appeal affirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court, the defendant has preferred the second appeal.

(6). IN this appeal, the substantial question of law has been formulated as hereunder: "whether on the fact of the admission of P. W. 1 that the P. W. 1 was married in 1981 and till then he used to take food in the joint mess of the defendants, could any separation of the family and that the transaction of the money was not borne from the joint fund of the three br







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