2007 Supreme(Cal) 841
High Court of Judicature at Calcutta
PRANAB KUMAR CHATTOPADHYAY & KALIDAS MUKHERJEE
Ranabir Saha
Versus
Union of India
M.A.T. Appeal No. 3754 of 2004
Decided On : 28-11-2007
For the Appearing Parties:Anindya Lahiri, Asok Kumar Jana, Kalyan Bandopadhyay, Malay Kumar Basu, Advocates.
PRANAB KUMAR CHATTOPADHYAY, J.
(1) THE appellant herein filed a writ petition being aggrieved by the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding on the basis of the charge-sheet issued by the concerned authority after lapse of 22 years from the date of commission of the alleged misconduct.
(2) THE learned Single Judge dismissed the aforesaid writ petition by the judgment and order dated 20th September, 2004 upon rejecting all the arguments made on behalf of the appellant herein.
(3) IT has been urged on behalf of the appellant that the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the said appellant cannot be sustained in the eye of law on the ground of delay alone. Various points were raised before the learned Single Judge while challenging the validity and/or legality of the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the appellant herein, but the learned Senior Counsel representing the said appellant while assailing the judgment and order under appeal confined his arguments only on the ground that the said disciplinary proceeding cannot be sustained on the ground of inordinate delay alone.
(4) MR. K. Bandyopadhyay, learned Senior Counsel representing the appellant submits that the charge-sheet was issued to the appellant herein on February 3, 2004 alleging the misconduct in connection with an incident which took place in the month of December, 1981. Mr. Bandyopadhyay further submits that the aforesaid disciplinary proceeding initiated against the appellant herein should have been quashed by the learned Single judge on the ground of inordinate delay alone. Mr. Bandyopadhyay referred to and relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P. V. Mahadevan v. MD, T. N. Housing Board, reported in 2005 (6) SCC 636 in support of his aforesaid arguments.
(5) MR. Malay Kumar Basu, learned Counsel representing the respondent authorities, however, submits that the delay in initiating the disciplinary proceeding was not unexplained. Mr. Basu further submits that the misconduct allegedly committed by the appellant herein was discovered on the basis of source information/complaint received by the ministry of Shipping and the Board sometimes in the month of October, 2003 from the Investigation report forwarded by the Vigilance Officer of the Kolkata Port Trust authorities. Mr. Basu also submits that the investigation report of the concerned Vigilance Officer was communicated to the respondent-Calcutta Dock Labour Board authorities on 23rd October, 2003 and thereafter, steps were taken by the competent authority of the board without any unnecessary delay. Mr. Basu submits that the Court may interfere and quash the charges if the delay is too long and unexplained, but in the present case, according to Mr. Basu, the concerned authority took expeditious steps for initiation of the disciplinary proceeding soon after discovering the irregularities. Mr. Basu referred to and relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab and ors. v. Chaman Lal Goyal, reported in 1995 (2) SCC 570 in support of his arguments.
(6) THERE is no doubt that the charge-sheet was issued to the appellant herein on February 3, 2004 alleging misconduct in connection with the incident regarding submission of L. T. C. Declaration Form dated 16th December, 1981 and thus, there was almost 22 years delay in initiating disciplinary proceeding by issuing formal charge-sheet to the appellant herein. The learned Single Judge while dealing with the aforesaid issue observed that because of the aforesaid delay, appellant herein did not suffer any prejudice.
(7) THE learned Senior Counsel of the appellant, however, submits that on account of the aforesaid delay in initiating the disciplinary proceeding, appellant herein is bound to suffer serious prejudice since the vital witness namely, the mother of the said appellant expired before completion of the disciplinary proceeding. The said learned Senior Counsel also submits that the mother of the said ap