Successive applications for the issue of a Writ or an order in the nature of Habeas Corpus, either under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, do not lie in the same High Court except in circumstances laid down by the Court.

Sankar Prasad Mitra, C. J. :- This Reference to the Full Bench has been made by Mr. Justice S.K. Bhattacharyya and Mr. Justice Sudhamay Basu on May 31, 1974 under Chapter VII, Rules 1 and 5 of the Appellate Side Rules as amended upto the 10th April, 1974.

2. One Ram Narayan Gupta was served with an order of detention dated the 7th April, 1972 which the District Magistrate of Midnapore had passed in the exercise of powers vested in him by Sub-Section (1) read with Sub-Section (2) of S.3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. By virtue of this order the detenu was arrested on the 13th April, 1972 on the ground that he was "acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community as evidenced by particulars stated therein."

3. On the 23rd May, 1972 the detenu obtained a Rule from this Court under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which was marked as Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 809 of 1972. This Rule was discharged by a Division Bench of this Court on the 3rd August, 1972.

4. On the 25th August, 1972 one Chunilal Gupta, a son of the detenu, obtained another Rule from this Court under Sec. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 relating to the same order of detention dated the 7th April, 1972.

5. The question arose as to whether the second application was maintainable. As there were differences of opinion on the maintainability of the second application between two Division Benches of this Court in judgements delivered in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 1359 of 1972 and Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 438 of 1972 the present Reference had been made.

6. The question referred to us is as follows :

"Do successive applications for issue of a Writ or an order in the nature of Habeas Corpus, either under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, lie in the same High Court ? If so, under what circumstances and to what extent the High Court may grant relief ?"

7. Our attention has been drawn by Counsel for both the parties to different decisions of High Courts in India. But it seems to us that except a passing reference to a decision of a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court it would not be necessary to discuss the High Court judgements in this case. The question that has been referred can be answered by relying on two decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1967 SC 908, (P.L. Lakhanpal v. Union of India) and AIR 1967 SC 1335 : (1967 Cri LJ 1204), (Ghulam Sarwar v. Union of India).

8. Before, however, we refer to the Supreme Court decisions, let us lay down the principles that should be applicable to a subsequent petition for issue of a Writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus. We shall try to support these principles by referring to appropriate passages in aforesaid Supreme Court judgement and also to a judgement of the Bombay High Court. The principles are as follows :-

(1) When an application for a Writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus either under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, is filed before a Bench of a High Court and a decision is pronounced thereon, it is a decision of the High Court itself. Successive applications on the same grounds do not lie to the same High Court.

(2) If grounds available to the detenu or the petitioner, as the case may be, at the time the first application is made are not pressed in that application, they cannot be made the subject-matter of a subsequent substantive application.

(3) Successive applications can, however, be made under two circumstances namely, (i) when facts or materials were in existence at the time of the first application but were not available to the petitioner or the detenu and (ii) when events have arisen subsequent to the making of the first application.

(4) The above principles, however, will not prevent the High Court in the exercise of its inherent power to grant relief in appropriate cases