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2011 Supreme(Cal) 1246

HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
S. K. MUKHERJEE, M. K. SINHA, JJ.
Amarendra Nath Ghosal - Appellant
Versus
Brij Mohan Agarwal - Respondent
F.A. No. 59 of 1990 with C.O.T. No. 405 of 1990
Decided on : Sep 08,2011

Advocates appeared:
Kasinath

In a suit for specific performance of a contract, the plaintiff must plead and prove the existence of a valid and enforceable contract, as well as his own readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract.

Headnote:

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT - SUIT FOR - ESSENTIAL TERMS - PLEADINGS - SECTION 16(C) OF THE SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 1963 - ORAL EVIDENCE - SECTION 91 AND 92 OF THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 - INTERPRETATION - COURT'S DISCRETION TO MOULD RELIEF - ENDS OF JUSTICE.

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of a contract to convey two cottah of land, or alternatively, for refund of earnest money. The defendant denied the agreement and claimed that he had only borrowed Rs. 30,000 from the plaintiff and executed a demand promissory note.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that there was no written agreement for the sale of the property and that the plaintiff had failed to prove the alleged agreement. However, the court found that the defendant had admitted receiving Rs. 30,000 from the plaintiff and that he was willing to refund the sum with interest.

Issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff had proved the existence of an agreement for the sale of the property? 2. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for specific performance of the alleged contract? 3. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to a refund of the earnest money?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the plaintiff had failed to prove the existence of an agreement for the sale of the property, as there was no written agreement and the oral evidence was inadmissible under Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. 2. The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree for specific performance of the alleged contract, as he had failed to plead and prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, as required by Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. 3. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a refund of the earnest money, as the defendant had admitted receiving the sum and had expressed his willingness to refund it.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal and the cross-objection. The defendant was directed to refund Rs. 30,000 with interest at the rate of 10% per annum to the plaintiff.

JUDGMENT

MUKHERJEE, J.

1. THIS is an appeal by the defendant No. 1 assailing a decree, inter alia, directing him to pay Rs. 30,000.00 (Rupees thirty thousand) only to the plaintiff together with interest at the rate of 10% (ten) per centum per annum from December 25, 1983 till the payment to the plaintiff.

2. A suit for specific performance of contract was instituted by the plaintiff/respondent No. 1. He alleged that the defendant No. 1, who is the appellant before this Court, agreed, for self and on behalf of his children, to convey two cottah of land at premises Nos. 54 and 55, Ballygunge Gardens, Calcutta, to the said plaintiff. The price was fixed at Rs. 75, 000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand) only per cottah. However, the defendant No. 1 was not agreeable to enter any formal agreement for sale, but accepted Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand) only as earnest money by executing a document. Although the document was described as a demand promissory note but, in fact, the defendant No. 1 accepted the said sum towards earnest money for self and on behalf of his children. Subsequently, the defendant No. 1 for self and on behalf of his children agreed to convey the entire four cottah seven square feet of land in the said premises in favour of the plaintiff. When the defendant No. 1 refused to execute the deed, the plaintiff instituted the suit for specific performance of contract, alternatively, for refund of the earnest money. The defendant No. 1 contested the suit by filing a written statement. He denied that there was ever any agreement between the defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff to convey two cottah of land or four cottah seven square feet of land to the plaintiff.

3. The defendant Nos. 2 to 5, also, filed their separate written statement and denied the plaint allegations.

4. ADMITTEDLY, there was no written agreement between the parties to convey the property. The exhibit 1 is a demand promissory note. The defendant No. 1 in his letterhead executed a promissory note for Rs. 30,000/-(Rupees thirty thousand) only promising to pay the said sum to the plaintiff together with interest at the rate of 10% (ten) per centum per annum. There was no whisper that the defendant No. 1 agreed to convey his property to the plaintiff.

Ordinarily under Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a written document is a sole repository of the transaction between the parties. Section 91 is based on the best evidence rule. The best evidence about the contents of a document is the document itself and it is the production of the document that is required under Section 91 in proof of its contents. Section 92 only excludes parol evidence as between the parties or their representatives to the instrument. The normal rule is that the contents of the document must be proved by primary evidence, which is the document itself in original. Oral evidence may guide the Court in unravelling the true intentions of the parties and tendering all extrinsic evidence as to acts, conducts, and surrounding circumstances to enable the Court to assume the real intention of the parties. However, when the intention of the parties to the document are express and clear from the terms of the document, oral evidence cannot be taken into consideration to find out the nature of the transaction.

5. MR. De, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant, submits that the plaintiff, on the reading of the plaint, was not entitled to a decree for specific performance of the alleged contract. He submits that the plaintiff has failed to aver and prove that he has performed or has, always, been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the alleged contract that on his part were to be performed by him. Not only that the plaintiff has failed to prove the alleged agreement, but, the plaintiff has, also, failed to prove that the defendant No. 1 was authorised by his children, by a registered power of attorney, as alleged by the plaintiff in the plaint, to enter into a










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