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2010 Supreme(Cal) 137

High Court of Calcutta
K.J. Sengupta & Kalidas Mukherjee, JJ.
Asit Ranjan Chakroborty – Appellant
Versus
Steel Authority of India Ltd. – Respondent
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction [Original Side] A.P.O. No. 65 of 2002 with W.P. 2099 of 1993
Decided On: Feb 16, 2010

A party can be estopped by his own conduct from challenging any action taken earlier.

Headnote:

EMPLOYMENT - TERMINATION - ESTOPPEL - REAPPOINTMENT - [S. 25-F(b) OF THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947] - The court held that the petitioner was estopped from challenging the order of termination of his employment as he had accepted the order and subsequently obtained reappointment on fresh terms and conditions.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner was terminated from service in 1980 and did not challenge the order. In 1983, he was re-employed on fresh terms and conditions. In 1993, he challenged the order of termination and sought consequential benefits, including seniority and payment of dues.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the petitioner was estopped from challenging the order of termination as he had accepted the order and subsequently obtained reappointment on fresh terms and conditions. The court also held that the petitioner's attempt to unsettle the settled issue could not be encouraged by the Competent Court of law.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was estopped from challenging the order of termination of his employment.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the petitioner was estopped from challenging the order of termination as he had accepted the order and subsequently obtained reappointment on fresh terms and conditions. The court also held that the petitioner's attempt to unsettle the settled issue could not be encouraged by the Competent Court of law.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal and directed the petitioner to make a representation to the respondent within one month from the date of receipt of the order. The respondent was directed to consider the representation in accordance with law within three months from the date of communication of such representation.

JUDGMENT

1. THE Court: This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the learned single Judge of this Court by which the writ petition was dismissed. In the writ petition the petitioner in substance prayed for quashing and/or setting aside the order of termination dated 14.7.1980 and also another communication dated 4.2.1993 and also asked for other benefits namely restoring seniority and also to pay a sum of Rs.4,71,625/- allegedly due and payable to the petitioner by the respondent due to wrongful termination from the service of the petitioner.

2. THE fact for filing the writ petition by the petitioner is stated hereunder: THE petitioner was a staff of clerical grade of first respondent and he was posted at Jagannath Ghat Stock Yard on 1st November, 1976 as Senior Assistant, thereafter transfer order followed on 10th February, 1978 from Jagannath Ghat Stock Yard to 4, India Exchange Place, Calcutta. He made several representations against the said order of transfer for withdrawing the same. However, his representations were turned down by the Personal Manager. It is alleged that the said order of rejection of the representation is without any reason. THErefore, he filed another representation for reconsideration of his prayer. But such action was resulted in rejection. Since then the petitioner started absenting himself from duty and on the ground of unauthorised absence he was proceeded with disciplinary action and enquiry was held and on considering of all the aspects conditional order was issued to the effect that in the event he failed to resume duty within certain time his service will stand terminated.

However, he did not resume. Therefore order of termination took place and this took place in the year 1980.

3. HE did not challenge at that point of time the said order of termination rather he made a request in writing to engage him in any suitable post.

4. CONSIDERING his prayer in the year 1983 he was re-employed and thereafter he continued to render services on the re-employment.

After having been engaged as above in the year 1993 he challenged the said order of transfer and also consequential benefits including the seniority position etc.

5. IT has been contended in the writ petition that order of termination is invalid and illegal as the same was not issued by the appointing authority and other ground was also raised. The said petition was resisted by filing affidavit in opposition taking the point of maintainability on the ground of delay and laches and it has been contended by the respondent that after having accepted the order of termination and subsequently offer of reemployment the said order of transfer cannot be challenged. Naturally question of restoring seniority and other benefits did not and could not arise.

6. THE learned Trial Judge it appears that he has dismissed the writ petition not only on the ground of delay but also on the ground of estoppel and waiver. It is observed that after having accepted re-employment preceded by acceptance of order of termination he challenged after 15 years in the writ jurisdiction is not maintainable.

The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Trial Judge failed to appreciate the real grievance of the petitioner that earlier order of termination of the year 1980 was not sustainable in law and acceptance of re-employment was under a compelling circumstances as he had no option but to accept the same but it was the understanding that the petitioner should be reinstated in the work in the form of reemployment as has been used in the order. Actually the said order of termination was not passed in accordance with law as the Learned Trial Judge failed to appreciate factual circumstances. According to him there cannot be any estoppel as against the Constitutional provision namely right to livelihood. Therefore, the order of termination should be set aside and all consequential benefit should be given after the judgment and/or impugned order hav









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