The normal rule of examination as incorporated in the Evidence Act ought to apply in a proceeding before the Industrial Tribunal and that the special provisions relating to deferment of cross-examination contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure have not been incorporated in the procedure for adjudication of a dispute of civil nature.

ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.

1. THE dispute out of which the present proceeding arises relates to revision of grade and scale of pay and other service conditions Of three stenographers appointed by the writ petitioner No. 1, art association of different commercial houses.

2. THE cause of the said stenographers was espoused by. the staff union (respondent no. 3) in this writ petition, and such dispute has been referred to the Fifth Industrial Tribunal by an order of reference dated December 28, 2006 issued by the State Government. Before the Tribunal, the respective parties being the writ petitioner and the union have filed their written statements. The writ petitioner has raised certain disputes as regards the maintainability of the reference, and locus of the union to take up the cause of the said stenographers but these disputes are not material for the purpose of adjudication of the present writ petition.

In this writ petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality of an order passed by the Tribunal on June 30,2009 rejecting an application of the petitioner No. 1 for deferment of cross-examination of the first witness of the union until examination-in-chief is concluded in respect of all the witnesses the union intend to examine on their behalf.

3. THIS application, however, was rejected by the Tribunal by an order passed on June 30, 2009. The Tribunal opined that the normal rule of examination as incorporated in the Evidence Act ought to apply in a proceeding before the Tribunal. It is this order, a copy of which has been made annexure "P7" to the writ petition, is under challenge in this proceeding.

4. MR. Dasgupta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that in the present case deferment of cross-examination has become necessary because in the event any lacuna in the case of union was exposed in course of cross-examination of a witness, such lacuna could have been filled up in course of examination-in-chief of the next witness of the union. His further case is that the union would not be prejudiced if such a course was adopted. According to MR. Dasgupta, the very fact that the Union was resisting his clients' prayer. made it apparent that they were going to take advantage of the situation in the manner apprehended by the petitioners, and they would utilise the opportunity for improving upon their case in course of examination-in-chief. He contended that deferment of cross-examination is permissible in such a situation under the provisions of Sections 231 and 242 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Relying on a decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Management of Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Cha Mazdoor Sangha and Another 2004-III-LLJ-772 (SC), MR Dasgupta argued that in appropriate cases, the Labour Court could rely on the rules of procedure found in the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Appearing for the Union, Mr. Bharat submitted that the established rule of evidence ought to apply in the case before the Tribunal. In this regard, he referred to the provisions of Section 138 of the Evidence Act, 1872. His further submission on this count is that the employer or any party to the process of adjudication could not compel the Tribunal or the Labour Court to modulate its own procedure in a manner it suited a particular party.

5. UNDER the provisions of Section 138 of the Evidence Act, in respect of each witness, examination-in-chief is to be conducted first, followed by cross-examination and re-examination, as the case may be. Mr. Dasgupta, however, drew my attention to the provisions of Sections 231 and 242 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Under these provisions, the Court has been conferred with discretionary power to permit cross-examination of any witness to be deferred until any other witness is examined or recall any witness for further cross-examination. Relying on the principle laid down in the case of Management of Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Cha Mazdo