Simultaneous adoption of two or more sons at a time and at one go if that is otherwise possible in fact in accordance with the requisites rites, is permissible.

1. BOTH the impugned Orders must and do survive these appeals, though with a little alteration by way of addition as indicated in the Judgment of Ray. J., following hereinafter, I agree with the order proposed by Ray. J. But a few words on some of the questions Involved. I Under the law as it stood before the enactment of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, one could not adopt two persons simultaneously, as ruled by the Privy Council in Akhoy Chunderbagchi vs. Kala Pahar Haji (12 indian Appeals 198) and then in Surendra Keshub vs. Doorgasoonderi (19 indian Appeals 108) The decisions of the Privy Council were severely criticized as erroneous and as wrong exposition of law arrived at by "lawyers without Sanskrit", as there was too provision anywhere in any of the Smritis or the Nibanu has prohibiting such adoption, while some of the provisions of the Codes of Atri, Ushana. Brihaspati and Likhita could reasonably be interpreted to permit, or even entourage, plurarity of sons, whether aurasa (natural), dattaka (adopted), or otherwise. (See, among others. Sarkar-Sastris Tagore Law Lectures on the Hindu Law of Adoption. The present Act of 1956, in prescribing the conditions for a valid adoption, has provided in Section 11 (i) that while adopting a Son, the adopter must not already have another Son, whether natural or adopted, living at the time of adoption. This clearly rules out what used to be called successive adoptions, i.e., the adoption of one after another has already been adopted and is in existence. But does not, at least expressly, rule out simultaneous adoption of two sons at a time and at one go if that is otherwise possible in fact in accordance with the requisits rites. The express prohibition in Section 11 (v) against simultaneous adoption of the same child by two or more adopters and the conspicuous absence of such a direct prohibition in respect of simultaneous adoption of two or more sons by the same adopter, may be of great significance. At any rate, now that under the present Act a childless person can adopt a son and also a daughter, a simultaneous adoption of two children of different sex would be permissible. And, but for the binding decisions of the Privy Council referred to hereinabove, I would have ventured to think that in view of the absence of any express prohibition in the earlier hindu Law against plurarity of adopted sons. the mad craze for sons among she early Hindus leading to recognition of twelve kinds of sons, including dattaka and Aurasha and the serious threat in our scriptural laws of banishment to hell to a childless person, eulogizing the Rahuputra and demonizing a Putraheena, a simultaneous adoption of more sons than one would not have been illegal. But accepting that simultaneous adoption of two or more sons was illegal and the award was wrong in [holding such adoption to be legal an award, even if liable to be set aside on the ground of such an error apparent does not and cannot become a nullity on the ground of any such error as no question of any jurisdictional error, which alone can make an award a nullity, is involved. And where, as here, such an award, far from being set aside or attempted to be set aside by appropriate proceedings, has become a rule of the court in the form of a decree, an execution thereof can no longer be resisted.

2. AN impression has not only gained ground but is very much deeprooted that anything relating to or covered by a testament is beyond the reach of arbitration. I am afraid that this is too broad a statement. True, it is only Civil Court (the so called Probate Court is obviously a civil court) which can grant or refuse to grant. Probate or cancel one already granted. Nothing extra-ordinary. For it is Civil Court, only, however labelled, which can grant matrimonial relief, or decree ejectment of tenant, or appoint guardians for minors. But from that alone, it cannot and does not follow that all disputes relating to spouses, or landlord an